Somaliland: Great example for Somalia

left of Somalia , between the al-Shabab extremists and the African Union puppet
‘Transitional Federal Government’ offers little hope of peaceful
resolution.  Al-Shabab are now deeply
entrenched, and with the help of foreign Jihadists, virtually control all
southern Somalia. However contentious, their viciously anti-feminist interpretation
of fundamentalist Islam brooks no opposition and is consequently far from
publicly popular, even outlawing watching sports contests and football on
television. More significantly, It also strikes at the roots of traditional
Sufi  Somali Islam with its cults of
local, and international saints whose graves are now regularly desecrated by
fundamentalist zealots. This is very much in the uncompromising spirit of
Salafi Saudi Arabia which serves as al-Shabab’s model of correct Muslim behaviour and,
more importantly provides the money that feeds its Somali enthusiasts. It thus
has a very strong grip on the impoverished young Somali males who constitute
the principal foot soldiers carrying al-Shabab’s banner and are in effect
mercenaries.

Somali society is extremely fragmented
along kinship lines and, to a degree most foreign observers fail to appreciate,
lacking in political centralisation. The familiar African chiefs are largely
absent in this highly individualistic world where the individual’s loyalties
are a matter of competing blood-ties. Such bonds cut across membership of al­-Shabab
whose leaders, however, tend to belong to the Hawiye clan-family, based in
central southern Somalia. The Somali historian, Said Samatar aptly described their
predecessors, the Union of Islamic courts, as a ‘fragile coalition  of clans wrapped in an Islamic flag to look
respectable’, al-Shabab similarly relies heavily on kinship ties to maintain
solidarity and confront its enemies. The underlying loyalties here are, as is
usual in the Somali world, fluid  and
readily subject to fission when the external conditions are propitious.
External pressures, especially from non-Islamic sources, normally provoke
internal solidarity. This of course is a major reason why external force,
intended to replace al-Shabab by less extreme forms of Islam will almost
certainly fail. Indeed, radical change in the al-Shabab regime is only likely
to be achieved by subtle internal initiatives and the problem would be how to
design and implement these. The perceived oppressive character of al-Shabab
provides abundant opportunities for currents of Somali disaffection to grow and
multiply.

A very important local factor here will be
the positive demonstration effect provided by the parallel existence of the
adjacent Somaliland Republic. Although largely officially ignored by the UN and
OAU, this state based on the former British Somaliland Protectorate had  initially joined Somalia, but in 1990, at the
climax of the collapse of dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre’s brutal regime, broke
away to reassert its independence ( see Lewis, 2010). Despite being regarded in
Somalia as a sort of phantom limb, with virtually no external help, this state
has built itself up by a remarkable series of internal peace agreements and
democratic consolidation to its current situation as a functioning democracy.
This has been achieved by local self-help and without the massive international
effort devoted, with such striking lack of success, to restoring governance in Somalia.
Somaliland has just had its second successful presidential election(and changed
president in a peaceful process validated by international observers). Its
people are Somalis like their kinsfolk in Somalia, but by a judicious
combination of traditional and modern politics, have successfully established a
viable modern government and associated institutions. Despite internal and
external pressures and with less economic resources than Somalia, these have
demonstrated remarkable viability and have, so far been blessed, by an
impressive degree of political stability ( see Jhazbhay,2009.)  Its time now to learn from Somaliland’s success and see how to emulate it.

I.M.Lewis FBA

Emeritus Professor of Anthropology, London
School of Economics.

Most recent Somali books: ‘Understanding
Somalia and Somaliland’, London, Hurst, 2008;

‘Making and Breaking States in Africa. The
Somali Experience’, New Jersey, Red Sea Press, 2010.

See also Markus Hoehne and Virginia Luling
(eds.) ‘Milk and Peace: Drought and War. Somali Culture, Society, and
Politics’, London, Hurst, 2010 (Essays in honour of IM Lewis for a
comprehensive assessment of Lewis’ contributions to Somali Studies); see also
entry in ‘Who’s Who’

The escalating war for control of what is
left of Somalia , between the al-Shabab extremists and the African Union puppet
‘Transitional Federal Government’ offers little hope of peaceful
resolution.  Al-Shabab are now deeply
entrenched, and with the help of foreign Jihadists, virtually control all
southern Somalia. However contentious, their viciously anti-feminist interpretation
of fundamentalist Islam brooks no opposition and is consequently far from
publicly popular, even outlawing watching sports contests and football on
television. More significantly, It also strikes at the roots of traditional
Sufi  Somali Islam with its cults of
local, and international saints whose graves are now regularly desecrated by
fundamentalist zealots. This is very much in the uncompromising spirit of
Salafi Saudi Arabia which serves as al-Shabab’s model of correct Muslim behaviour and,
more importantly provides the money that feeds its Somali enthusiasts. It thus
has a very strong grip on the impoverished young Somali males who constitute
the principal foot soldiers carrying al-Shabab’s banner and are in effect
mercenaries.

Somali society is extremely fragmented
along kinship lines and, to a degree most foreign observers fail to appreciate,
lacking in political centralisation. The familiar African chiefs are largely
absent in this highly individualistic world where the individual’s loyalties
are a matter of competing blood-ties. Such bonds cut across membership of al­-Shabab
whose leaders, however, tend to belong to the Hawiye clan-family, based in
central southern Somalia. The Somali historian, Said Samatar aptly described their
predecessors, the Union of Islamic courts, as a ‘fragile coalition  of clans wrapped in an Islamic flag to look
respectable’, al-Shabab similarly relies heavily on kinship ties to maintain
solidarity and confront its enemies. The underlying loyalties here are, as is
usual in the Somali world, fluid  and
readily subject to fission when the external conditions are propitious.
External pressures, especially from non-Islamic sources, normally provoke
internal solidarity. This of course is a major reason why external force,
intended to replace al-Shabab by less extreme forms of Islam will almost
certainly fail. Indeed, radical change in the al-Shabab regime is only likely
to be achieved by subtle internal initiatives and the problem would be how to
design and implement these. The perceived oppressive character of al-Shabab
provides abundant opportunities for currents of Somali disaffection to grow and
multiply.

A very important local factor here will be
the positive demonstration effect provided by the parallel existence of the
adjacent Somaliland Republic. Although largely officially ignored by the UN and
OAU, this state based on the former British Somaliland Protectorate had  initially joined Somalia, but in 1990, at the
climax of the collapse of dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre’s brutal regime, broke
away to reassert its independence ( see Lewis, 2010). Despite being regarded in
Somalia as a sort of phantom limb, with virtually no external help, this state
has built itself up by a remarkable series of internal peace agreements and
democratic consolidation to its current situation as a functioning democracy.
This has been achieved by local self-help and without the massive international
effort devoted, with such striking lack of success, to restoring governance in Somalia.
Somaliland has just had its second successful presidential election(and changed
president in a peaceful process validated by international observers). Its
people are Somalis like their kinsfolk in Somalia, but by a judicious
combination of traditional and modern politics, have successfully established a
viable modern government and associated institutions. Despite internal and
external pressures and with less economic resources than Somalia, these have
demonstrated remarkable viability and have, so far been blessed, by an
impressive degree of political stability ( see Jhazbhay,2009.)  Its time now to learn from Somaliland’s success and see how to emulate it.

I.M.Lewis FBA

Emeritus Professor of Anthropology, London
School of Economics.

Most recent Somali books: ‘Understanding
Somalia and Somaliland’, London, Hurst, 2008;

‘Making and Breaking States in Africa. The
Somali Experience’, New Jersey, Red Sea Press, 2010.

See also Markus Hoehne and Virginia Luling
(eds.) ‘Milk and Peace: Drought and War. Somali Culture, Society, and
Politics’, London, Hurst, 2010 (Essays in honour of IM Lewis for a
comprehensive assessment of Lewis’ contributions to Somali Studies); see also
entry in ‘Who’s Who’