Ethiopia Targets Unlicensed Hawala Networks as Addis Ababa Tightens Control of Remittance Flows
The National Bank of Ethiopia has intensified its campaign against unauthorized remittance and hawala networks, naming a group of money-transfer operators it says are not licensed to provide remittance services into Ethiopia.
The August 28 warning specifically identified operators including Adulis Money Transfer, Amana Express, Bakaal Money Transfer, Ramad Pay/Ramada Pay, Kaah, Tasa Pay, World Direct Link, Amal Express, Avanti, Jubba Express, Shgey Money Transfer, Tawakal Money Services, Zola, Amal USA, Awash Direct, Rasmy Pay, Taaj Financial Service and USwyre.
Some versions of the central bank’s notice combine related names, producing a list of roughly 17 entities rather than treating every brand name separately.
The distinction is important.
The National Bank is not necessarily accusing every named company of being an illegal business internationally. It is saying these entities lack the authorization required to provide remittance services to Ethiopia through the regulated Ethiopian financial system.
Under Ethiopia’s foreign-exchange rules, international remittance providers must operate through institutions and arrangements approved by the National Bank. Authorized Ethiopian representatives are also required to conduct customer identification and anti-money-laundering checks.
The central bank warns that customers using unauthorized channels could face delayed payments, frozen or restricted accounts, financial losses and possible regulatory action affecting both senders and recipients.
That makes the warning particularly important for the Ethiopian and Somali diaspora.
Hawala and remittance networks form one of the financial arteries of the Horn of Africa. Families, traders and small businesses often depend on them because they can move money rapidly into communities where conventional banking remains limited.
But Addis Ababa increasingly wants those flows inside a system it can monitor.
This is therefore about more than consumer protection.
It is also about foreign currency, financial surveillance and state control over cross-border money movements.
Remittances provide valuable hard currency. Money entering through informal hawala arrangements can bypass official banks, reduce foreign-exchange inflows recorded by the central bank and make it harder for regulators to identify the ultimate sender, beneficiary and purpose of transactions.
Ethiopia has consequently been tightening its enforcement for months.
In December 2025, the National Bank publicly warned that it was taking action against unauthorized operators and, significantly, also against recipients of funds transmitted through illegal channels. It repeated the warning again in April 2026.
The latest notice therefore represents an escalation of an existing policy rather than an isolated announcement.
There is also an important detail for Somali financial institutions.
The NBE’s current official list of authorized remittance providers includes Dahabshiil, alongside major international services such as MoneyGram, Remitly, Ria, Western Union, WorldRemit and Taptap Send.
That demonstrates that Ethiopia is not simply closing its market to Somali-linked remittance businesses.
It is dividing the market between companies that operate through approved Ethiopian channels and those that do not.
WARYATV ASSESSMENT
The deeper story is the formalization of money movement across the Horn of Africa.
For decades, hawala networks succeeded precisely because they could move money faster than governments could regulate it.
That advantage is now becoming a vulnerability.
Governments increasingly want every dollar entering their economies to pass through regulated institutions capable of conducting customer verification, anti-money-laundering checks and financial reporting.
Ethiopia also has another powerful incentive:
foreign exchange.
Every remittance routed through the regulated banking system strengthens the official foreign-currency market. Every large informal channel operating outside it potentially weakens Addis Ababa’s ability to manage reserves and monitor capital flows.
Somali remittance companies therefore face a strategic choice.
The future is unlikely to be the disappearance of hawala.
It is the transformation of hawala into licensed, traceable and internationally compliant financial infrastructure.
For diaspora customers, the immediate lesson is simpler: before sending money to Ethiopia, check the National Bank’s current authorized list rather than assuming that a company legally operating in Somalia, Somaliland, Europe or North America is automatically licensed to deliver funds inside Ethiopia.
Addis Ababa is not trying to eliminate remittances. It is trying to make sure the Ethiopian state can see—and regulate—the money coming in.
