How Undersea Cables and Offshore Gas Are Changing Red Sea Defence
The most consequential Red Sea targets may not be ships. They are the cables carrying data and the energy infrastructure that modern economies cannot quickly replace.
Security has moved below the waterline
Red Sea defence was once discussed mainly in terms of straits, ports and merchant vessels. Undersea communications cables now carry critical digital traffic through the region, while offshore energy installations and prospective projects increase the value of seabed infrastructure. Cable faults in 2024 demonstrated how a maritime incident can disrupt connectivity far beyond the immediate area.
These systems are difficult to defend continuously. Most cable damage worldwide is accidental, often involving anchors or fishing activity, but conflict increases the risks of deliberate interference, delayed repair and false attribution. Offshore platforms are visible fixed assets; cables are dispersed, lightly protected and dependent on specialized repair vessels.
Defence must include recovery
European cable-security policy uses a useful cycle: prevention, detection, response, recovery and deterrence. Applied to the Red Sea, that means accurate cable charts, anchoring controls, vessel monitoring, redundant terrestrial and subsea routes, repair agreements, stockpiled components and legal cooperation across jurisdictions.
Coastal states such as Somaliland can contribute through port-state controls, incident reporting, protection of landing stations and maritime-domain awareness. They should avoid publishing precise vulnerability data. Telecommunications operators, energy companies and navies need rehearsed protocols before a crisis.
WARYATV Assessment
Undersea infrastructure is turning Red Sea defence into economic continuity planning. A navy may deter an attacker, but it cannot replace a cable-repair ship, a redundant route or a secure landing station. Somaliland should classify cable landings and future offshore energy as critical national infrastructure, require resilience audits and build redundant international connectivity. The strategic contest will increasingly be decided by which states can recover services fastest—not only by which forces can destroy them.
Sources: ITU–ICPC Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience | EU Action Plan on Cable Security | ICPC cable-protection publications
