BAGHDAD AT THE CENTER OF A REGIONAL WAR
The joint American-Saudi strikes against Iran-aligned armed groups in Iraq have exposed a strategic reality Baghdad has avoided confronting for years: Iraq contains powerful military organizations that receive state salaries and legal recognition while retaining weapons, political loyalties and operational chains of command beyond the effective control of the Iraqi government.
The strikes reportedly targeted militia facilities across several Iraqi provinces after more than 30 drone attacks were directed at Saudi energy infrastructure and American military positions over a three-day period. Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces said at least 20 of its personnel were killed, while Saudi Arabia and US Central Command described the operation as an act of self-defense against groups directed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The immediate confrontation is important.
The larger issue is how Iran spent more than two decades constructing a military-political network inside Iraq that can launch regional attacks, challenge Baghdad’s foreign policy and provoke foreign retaliation on Iraqi territory.
This is no longer merely a militia problem.
It is a crisis over who possesses the final authority to make war in Iraq.
THE VACUUM AFTER 2003
Iran’s opportunity emerged from the collapse of the Iraqi state following the 2003 US-led invasion.
The destruction of Saddam Hussein’s security structure, the disbandment of the Iraqi army and the fragmentation of national institutions created an environment in which armed political movements could flourish.
Tehran moved rapidly.
It cultivated political parties, financed armed factions, trained commanders and supplied increasingly advanced weapons. Some groups initially fought American forces. Others expanded during the Syrian civil war or mobilized against Daesh after 2014.
Over time, Iran’s allies ceased to operate only as underground insurgents.
They entered parliament, acquired government ministries, developed commercial networks and embedded themselves within Iraq’s formal security architecture. Reuters reports that the most hardline factions gathered under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq comprise roughly 10 organizations with an estimated 50,000 fighters and arsenals that include drones, long-range missiles and anti-aircraft weapons.
Iran’s strategic achievement was not simply the creation of armed proxies.
It was the integration of those proxies into the Iraqi state without requiring them to surrender their independent power.
THE POPULAR MOBILIZATION PARADOX
The Popular Mobilization Forces emerged as an essential component of Iraq’s fight against Daesh.
Many PMF fighters made significant sacrifices defending Iraqi cities and religious sites when the regular security forces were under extraordinary pressure.
But the organization evolved into a complex umbrella containing nationalist groups, religious formations and factions with deep ideological and operational ties to Tehran.
The PMF is legally recognized as part of Iraq’s security establishment.
Yet some of its most powerful formations continue to maintain independent command structures and regional agendas.
This creates an extraordinary constitutional contradiction.
Iraq funds armed organizations that may undertake military operations without the authorization of the Iraqi commander-in-chief. When those operations trigger foreign retaliation, Iraqi civilians, infrastructure and national sovereignty bear the consequences.
Iran benefits from this ambiguity.
Its partners can describe themselves as Iraqi state forces when seeking legitimacy, salaries and legal protection. When carrying out controversial regional operations, they present themselves as autonomous resistance movements.
They are inside the state when that provides protection—and outside it when accountability becomes inconvenient.
KATA’IB HEZBOLLAH: TEHRAN’S CLOSEST IRAQI PARTNER
Among the most powerful groups is Kata’ib Hezbollah, founded in the mid-2000s by Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis.
Muhandis was killed alongside Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in a January 2020 US strike near Baghdad International Airport.
The organization developed its reputation through rocket, mortar, sniper and roadside-bomb attacks against American forces. It later fought alongside Iran-backed forces in Syria and repeatedly challenged Iraqi government demands that attacks on US positions cease.
US intelligence has estimated that Kata’ib Hezbollah may command as many as 10,000 personnel. Iraqi officials and militia members have described an arsenal including attack drones, rockets and short-range ballistic missiles.
The group represents the most advanced expression of Iran’s Iraqi model: a heavily armed faction with political protection, regional reach and the ability to influence whether Iraq remains at peace or enters conflict.
ASA’IB AHL AL-HAQ: FROM INSURGENCY TO PARLIAMENT
Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq, led by Qais Al-Khazali, emerged in 2006 after separating from Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.
Khazali was detained by American forces in 2007 over his alleged involvement in the Karbala attack that killed five US soldiers. He was released approximately three years later.
The movement subsequently expanded during the campaign against Daesh and entered formal politics through its Al-Sadiqoun parliamentary bloc.
This political transformation demonstrates the adaptability of Iran-aligned organizations.
Militias do not need to choose between weapons and elections.
They can use military power to strengthen political influence and political influence to protect military autonomy.
Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq has at times sought to present itself as a conventional political movement. Yet it remains strongly opposed to the American military presence and is considered one of Tehran’s most influential Iraqi partners.
THE BADR ORGANIZATION: THE ORIGINAL MODEL
The Badr Organization predates the 2003 invasion.
It was established in Iran during the Iran-Iraq War as the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Its members fought alongside Iran against Saddam Hussein’s government.
After 2003, Badr returned to Iraq and became deeply integrated into the political and security establishment.
Its trajectory became the model Tehran would repeatedly follow: transform a loyal armed movement into a durable political institution with influence inside ministries, parliament and the security services.
Other factions—including Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali and Saraya Al-Khorasani—expanded the network further, creating overlapping military organizations capable of operating in Iraq, Syria and the broader region.
IRAN’S STRATEGIC DESIGN
Iran’s Iraqi network was never constructed solely to defend Iraq.
It forms part of a wider regional architecture stretching through Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.
The system allows Tehran to pressure opponents across multiple theaters while reducing the political and military cost of direct Iranian involvement.
Its key advantages are clear:
Iran can threaten US forces without always launching from Iranian territory.
It can pressure Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states through Iraqi or Yemeni partners.
It can support operations against Israel through multiple geographic fronts.
It can deny direct responsibility when escalation becomes dangerous.
This is strategic depth through decentralization.
But it transfers enormous risk to the states in which those groups operate.
Lebanon pays the price for Hezbollah’s confrontations.
Yemen bears the consequences of Houthi warfare.
Iraq now risks becoming the next arena in which Iran’s regional strategy collides directly with American and Saudi military power.
WHY THE US-SAUDI STRIKES ARE DIFFERENT
American forces have struck Iran-aligned groups in Iraq before.
Saudi Arabia’s direct participation changes the regional meaning of the operation.
Riyadh said the strikes were coordinated with US Central Command after drones launched from Iraqi territory attempted to hit oil infrastructure in the kingdom. Saudi officials insisted that the operation was defensive and warned that attacks on national energy assets would not go unanswered.
This suggests the confrontation is no longer limited to Iran, Israel and the United States.
Gulf states that previously sought to avoid direct involvement may now respond militarily when Iran’s proxies threaten their strategic infrastructure.
For Iraq, this is a dangerous threshold.
If militias continue launching attacks against neighboring states, Baghdad could face repeated foreign strikes, diplomatic isolation and demands to dismantle groups it may lack the political strength to confront.
BAGHDAD’S IMPOSSIBLE CHOICE
The Iraqi government faces three unattractive options.
It can attempt to disarm the strongest factions, risking armed resistance and internal political crisis.
It can tolerate their continued autonomy, allowing Iraq to remain a launch platform for regional warfare.
Or it can pursue gradual integration, hoping commanders will surrender heavy weapons in exchange for political guarantees and positions within the state.
Recent Iraqi initiatives have sought to place missiles, drones, tanks and artillery under government control. Some factions have shown limited willingness to cooperate, while Kata’ib Hezbollah, Harakat Al-Nujaba and Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada have reportedly rejected disarmament while American forces remain in Iraq.
The difficulty is not merely technical.
These organizations possess political parties, parliamentary allies, businesses and patronage networks.
Disarmament would therefore threaten an entire political economy—not only armed units.
IRAQI LEADERS SOUND THE ALARM
Former Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi has argued that restoring state control over weapons has become a sovereign necessity.
His warning reflects an increasingly widespread Iraqi fear: armed factions claiming to defend Iraq may instead expose it to wars decided in Tehran, Washington, Riyadh or Jerusalem.
Muqtada Al-Sadr has issued a similar appeal, warning “rogue militias” against giving foreign powers a justification to attack Iraq and insisting that the country has endured enough war.
These statements are not simply political rhetoric.
They reflect a fundamental question confronting modern Iraq:
Can a sovereign state coexist indefinitely with military organizations that possess independent regional loyalties and the capability to initiate international conflict?
WARYATV STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
Iran’s greatest success in Iraq was not building militias stronger than the Iraqi army.
It was making the militias inseparable from the Iraqi political system.
They cannot be removed easily because they are no longer external insurgents operating from isolated camps.
They are parliamentarians, security officials, commercial actors and state-funded commanders.
This institutional embedding gives Tehran influence that conventional military occupation could never have achieved.
But Iran’s success has become Iraq’s strategic vulnerability.
Each drone launched against Saudi infrastructure weakens Baghdad’s claim to control its own territory.
Each unauthorized attack against American forces invites retaliation.
Each militia refusal to surrender heavy weapons demonstrates that legal recognition has not produced genuine state command.
The latest strikes have therefore revealed more than the location of militia headquarters.
They have revealed the limits of Iraqi sovereignty.
WARYATV ASSESSMENT
Iraq is no longer facing a simple contest between the government and armed groups.
It is confronting a parallel order that has grown inside the institutions of the republic.
Iran spent more than two decades constructing that order through money, ideology, weapons and political integration.
The United States and Saudi Arabia have now demonstrated that they are prepared to strike it directly when it threatens their forces or infrastructure.
Baghdad must decide whether Iraq will remain a sovereign state that controls war and peace—or a territory where foreign powers and armed proxies settle their conflicts.
The longer that decision is postponed, the greater the risk that Iraq will once again become the battlefield of other nations.
By WARYATV Intelligence Desk | waryatv@waryatv.com
