The Horn’s competing alliances are becoming clearer: Cairo, Mogadishu and Asmara are coordinating—while Hargeisa is standing beside Addis Ababa.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro has delivered his clearest statement yet on the rapidly changing balance of power in the Horn of Africa, declaring confidence in Somaliland’s relationship with Ethiopia and opposing interference that could threaten Ethiopia’s stability or national existence.
His remarks were more than a routine expression of good-neighbourliness. They came after Egypt, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan issued the October 4 El Alamein Declaration—a coordinated regional document that explicitly rejected recognition of Somaliland, defended Somalia’s territorial claim and declared that Red Sea governance belongs exclusively to coastal states.
Two competing strategic positions
The declaration connects several disputes that are often discussed separately: Somaliland’s recognition, Ethiopia’s search for maritime access, Egyptian concerns over the Nile and Eritrean fears about Ethiopian intentions toward the Red Sea.
Somaliland and Ethiopia consequently face overlapping pressure from the same emerging alignment. Mogadishu opposes Somaliland’s independence and the 2024 maritime memorandum with Addis Ababa. Egypt wants to constrain Ethiopian power over the Nile. Eritrea views Ethiopia’s sea-access ambitions as a potential threat to its sovereignty.
The El Alamein summit does not establish a formal military alliance. Yet its proposed coordination mechanism creates a diplomatic platform through which those shared interests can be translated into continuing pressure.
Irro’s statement signals that Somaliland will not remain silent while neighbouring governments coordinate against both Hargeisa and Addis Ababa.
Partnership without automatic entanglement
Somaliland has strong reasons to preserve relations with Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a major trading partner, a market for Berbera and the essential inland anchor of the Berbera Corridor. The January 2024 memorandum offered Ethiopia coastal access while raising the possibility of eventual Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland.
But Hargeisa must distinguish partnership from unconditional alignment. Supporting Ethiopia’s territorial integrity does not require endorsing every Ethiopian military action or becoming involved in its conflict with Eritrea.
That conflict is no longer theoretical. Ethiopia has accused Eritrean forces of entering Tigray and supporting armed groups; Eritrea denies the allegations and has asked the UN Security Council to act against Addis Ababa. Independent verification remains incomplete, although military movements and fighting near the border have been documented.
WARYATV Assessment
Irro has correctly recognized that the El Alamein alignment challenges Somaliland’s strategic interests. The appropriate response, however, is not rhetorical escalation. Somaliland should convert its relationship with Ethiopia into measurable agreements covering corridor trade, customs, infrastructure protection and political consultation.
Hargeisa should also preserve diplomatic channels with Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea. Somaliland gains little from being portrayed as an extension of Ethiopian regional policy.
The president’s statement draws an important line: Somaliland will oppose efforts to destabilize Ethiopia. The next task is harder—supporting its closest neighbour without allowing Ethiopia’s conflicts to become Somaliland’s conflicts.
