Houthis, Berbera and Food Security: Why Somaliland Must Prepare Now
Somaliland does not need a missile to hit Berbera to face a food emergency. Ships cancelling calls, insurers withdrawing cover and traders struggling to replace cargo could carry Yemen’s war into household kitchens. Government preparedness must begin before those decisions leave families paying the price.
The danger has sharpened. Associated Press reports Houthi advances around Mokha and Bab el-Mandeb amid renewed fighting. Further strikes and retaliation could widen maritime disruption; a complete shutdown of Somaliland’s supplies is a scenario, not an established fact.
The food exposure is measurable
Somaliland’s Finance Ministry trade bulletin records substantial 2024 imports of rice, wheat flour, sugar, cooking oil, pasta and milk powder. These are annual trade flows, not current reserves or a measure of domestic consumption.
Local production offers no instant substitute. A February 2026 assessment estimated the northwest’s 2025 Gu/Karan cereal harvest at 2,700 tonnes—65% below average. This is a seasonal production estimate, not an inventory of food available today.
Where is the emergency cover?
Somaliland’s longstanding food-security strategy explicitly called for strategic reserves. The public records reviewed here do not establish today’s usable government stocks or days of cover. That gap demands disclosure; it does not prove every warehouse is empty.
Commercial capacity is different from emergency entitlement. DP World announced an 18,000-tonne edible-oil terminal project in 2023. An announced capacity cannot establish today’s stock, its ownership or government access during a crisis.
How disruption becomes a nightmare
Geography matters: Berbera lies on the Gulf of Aden, accessible from the Indian Ocean without crossing Bab el-Mandeb. Closing the strait alone would not seal the port. The greater danger is conflict spreading across its approaches or making commercial calls untenable.
The plausible chain is escalating attacks, cancelled sailings, dearer replacement cargo, higher fuel costs and shrinking household purchasing power. Hunger can deepen while food remains on shelves. UNCTAD has documented how maritime disruption transmits costs into food security.
Ethiopia is also exposed: the World Bank reported in 2023 that over 95% of its trade by volume used the Addis–Djibouti corridor. Berbera offers diversification, but both gateways face Gulf of Aden risks. Neither country should assume its neighbour can supply unlimited emergency relief.
Government must show its preparations
Authorities should publish verified days of food cover, secure alternative cargo arrangements, protect essential transport fuel and fund targeted household support. Parliament should demand a responsible lead agency, deadlines and financing. Reassurance without those details is inadequate.
Direct Indian Ocean sourcing deserves urgent commercial testing. So do emergency agreements with importers and neighbouring governments. Alternatives require willing carriers, insurance, credit and functioning border procedures. Waiting until everyone seeks replacement supplies would surrender bargaining power precisely when public resources and household budgets are under the greatest strain.
WARYATV Assessment
Complacency would turn a foreseeable external shock into an avoidable domestic failure. Somaliland cannot control the Houthis, but it can reduce dependence on last-minute purchases. The time to establish reserves, contracts and public confidence is while supplies can still arrive—not after families discover that their next meal depends on an emergency negotiation.
Evidence box: the food Somaliland imports
Selected entries from the Finance Ministry’s Trade Statistical Bulletin 2024, commodity appendices. The copy inspected is hosted on Scribd. These are recorded annual imports; they do not identify current stocks, domestic consumption or onward trade. The ministry lists a 2025 bulletin, but its contents could not be retrieved for this review; these figures are therefore labelled 2024, not presented as the latest annual totals.
| Commodity | Reported 2024 quantity | Metric equivalent where applicable |
|---|---|---|
| Rice | 7,972,984 bags of 50 kg | 398,649.200 tonnes |
| Wheat flour | 8,007,876 bags of 50 kg | 400,393.800 tonnes |
| Sugar | 9,855,059 bags of 50 kg | 492,752.950 tonnes |
| Wheat grain | 637,598 bags of 50 kg | 31,879.900 tonnes |
| Maize | 285,648 bags of 50 kg | 14,282.400 tonnes |
| Cooking oil | 51,305,040 litres | Keep as volume |
| Pasta/macaroni | 88,115,572 kg | 88,115.572 tonnes |
| Milk powder | 11,657,552 kg | 11,657.552 tonnes |
| Fresh vegetables | 56,442,704 kg | 56,442.704 tonnes |
| Fresh fruit | 20,195,727 kg | 20,195.727 tonnes |
Source: Trade Statistical Bulletin 2024. Conversions: bags × 0.05; kilograms ÷ 1,000. Litres remain litres. Quantities are reported, not independently audited. The bulletin contains inconsistent aggregate percentage calculations; those percentages are not used here. Current procurement decisions require updated, reconciled customs and stock records.
What Somaliland has—and what the evidence does not establish
Production: Somaliland has domestic cereal farming, livestock and fisheries. Its own strategy identifies sorghum and maize, livestock products and fisheries development. However, potential production is not an emergency stockpile. The recent northwest cereal estimate covers one seasonal harvest and must not be divided into annual gross imports to manufacture a national self-sufficiency percentage.
Commercial infrastructure: Berbera has developed shipping and logistics connections. A direct Jebel Ali–Berbera service was announced in October 2025. Such a service is evidence of a commercial connection at that date, not confirmation that every scheduled sailing operates under current wartime conditions. An Indian Ocean approach can bypass Bab el-Mandeb, but a voyage originating inside the Persian Gulf also has Hormuz exposure.
Public emergency capacity: Somaliland has a National Disaster Preparedness and Food Reserve Authority, NADFOR. FutureWater reported an April 2026 handover of a drought-forecasting model to NADFOR and Somalia’s separate disaster agency. That is evidence of preparedness work, but it does not establish food stocks or a maritime contingency plan. The criticism should demand demonstrable shipping resilience rather than claim that all officials have done nothing.
The missing answers: Audited public stocks by commodity; usable private stocks available under emergency agreements; replenishment lead times; funded procurement commitments; and a public calculation of days of cover. This review did not include inspections or responses from officials or importers. It cannot establish that Somaliland has zero food storage, that no contingency plan exists, or how soon shortages would develop.
Regional comparison: Somaliland and Ethiopia face substantial but different vulnerabilities. The evidence reviewed does not support ranking them as the two countries that would suffer most. Yemen and other exposed populations must not disappear from the assessment. Ethiopia’s agricultural investment plan includes domestic production and food-reserve objectives; those objectives do not establish current surplus availability. Somaliland should seek negotiated cooperation rather than presume spare supplies.
Escalation scenarios: what would change the assessment?
These are conditional scenarios, not forecasts or claims that the listed developments have occurred.
| Scenario | Likely transmission mechanism | Evidence that would justify escalation of the response |
|---|---|---|
| More attacks, shipping continues | Higher insurance and freight costs; longer or less predictable deliveries | Actual insurance quotations, carrier notices, missed delivery dates and wholesale prices |
| Bab el-Mandeb transit becomes unavailable, eastern approaches remain usable | Cargo normally arriving through the Red Sea needs a different route or origin; direct eastern approaches remain geographically possible | Confirmed route restrictions and shipowners’ willingness to accept Berbera/Djibouti calls |
| Gulf of Aden risk drives a wider commercial withdrawal | Fewer port calls and tighter physical availability, alongside fuel and financing pressure | Sustained cancellations, withdrawn cover, falling usable stock cover and failure to secure replacement cargo |
The most severe case could emerge without a formally declared blockade. A port can remain physically intact while sufficiently few commercial operators are willing to serve it. Conversely, military action could reduce particular threats. Its effects must be assessed through shipping behaviour and supply conditions, not assumed from the occurrence of an attack alone. The historical cost mechanism is documented in the scenarios above are WARYATV analysis.
A practical preparedness agenda
The following are WARYATV proposals for government, importers and humanitarian partners, not descriptions of an adopted programme.
Count usable food first. NADFOR, finance and trade authorities should reconcile public stocks, commercial inventories and confirmed incoming cargo. Separate food already committed to onward trade. Publish aggregate days of cover without disclosing sensitive warehouse locations. Calculate cover commodity by commodity against verified domestic requirements.
Test 30-, 60- and 90-day disruptions. These are planning horizons, not an assertion of current reserve levels or a prescribed stock target. Identify the food, money, storage, transport and administrative authority required for each case. Size any reserve against evidence, cost and replenishment time.
Contract alternatives while they remain available. Explore direct supply from Indian Ocean origins and transshipment options outside Hormuz, with shipowners and insurers confirming feasibility. Buying from another trader is not diversification if the cargo still depends on the same vulnerable hub. Any Cape diversion still needs a commercially usable final approach to the destination.
Agree regional arrangements in advance. Discuss emergency customs procedures, truck permissions, prioritisation and procurement with Ethiopia and Djibouti. Assess other ports and land corridors against actual capacity, security, transit permissions and delivered cost. Bosaso shares Gulf of Aden exposure; more distant Indian Ocean gateways require substantial onward logistics. None is an automatic replacement.
Make reserves accessible and maintainable. Combine appropriately sized public stocks with enforceable commercial supply arrangements where useful. Inspect quality, rotate stock and audit releases. A storage building, an empty tank and a financed food reserve are different assets. Disperse supply where practical so one interruption cannot disable every distribution point.
Protect food access as well as imports. Preserve fuel for essential transport and water delivery. Budget targeted assistance for households losing purchasing power. Track wholesale and retail prices, investigate substantiated manipulation and publish reliable information; avoid policies that unintentionally discourage replacement imports.
Farm support, water management, fisheries and better storage remain necessary longer-term measures. They cannot be promised as an immediate substitute for interrupted staple imports. The near-term test is whether existing food and replacement supply can reach households at a price they can afford.
