Russia is increasingly resorting to unconventional methods of intelligence collection in Scandinavia, according to Finland’s Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO). The agency’s warning comes as Moscow adjusts its espionage tactics following widespread diplomatic expulsions across Europe and heightened scrutiny of its operations since Finland and Sweden joined NATO.
Traditionally, Russian intelligence has relied on operatives stationed at embassies and consulates, where diplomatic immunity shields them from local law enforcement. However, the number of intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover in Finland and other Scandinavian nations has significantly decreased.
This shift stems largely from the expulsion of Russian diplomats, including spies, by European countries after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Finland, alongside its neighbors, has also imposed stringent limits on the issuance of diplomatic visas for Russian nationals, leaving many Russian embassies understaffed and unable to sustain traditional intelligence operations.
Facing these constraints, Russian intelligence agencies are increasingly turning to “nontraditional” collectors, as outlined in a report by Finnish broadcaster Yle. These operatives, who lack diplomatic immunity, often operate under the guise of journalists, academics, or researchers, SUPO says. This approach allows them to bypass traditional security measures, although it increases the risks of exposure and legal consequences.
In parallel, Russian agencies are targeting Finnish nationals who live in or travel through Russia, pressuring them for information or recruiting them for intelligence tasks. This strategy takes advantage of cultural and linguistic connections, as well as the vulnerabilities of individuals traveling in less secure environments.
Another troubling trend highlighted by SUPO involves the Kremlin’s reliance on criminal networks to further its intelligence goals. Criminals, including hackers, are recruited and incentivized with payments and protection.
Russia has created what SUPO describes as “favorable conditions” for cybercriminals, granting them operational freedom within its borders in exchange for collaboration. These hackers are tasked with conducting cyber espionage, sabotage, and influence operations on behalf of the Russian state. This arrangement provides plausible deniability for Moscow, enabling it to obscure the Kremlin’s role in cyberattacks and other illegal activities.
Russia’s intensified focus on Scandinavia is closely tied to Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO. These developments have heightened Moscow’s interest in gathering intelligence on the alliance’s northern flank, where new military and strategic challenges are emerging.
The shift to nontraditional intelligence methods complicates counterintelligence efforts in Scandinavia. Unlike embassy-based operatives, nontraditional agents are harder to monitor and often operate in more covert ways, leveraging unsuspecting civilian networks or exploiting professional exchanges.
SUPO’s warning underscores the growing complexity of the espionage landscape in Europe, where Russia appears to be recalibrating its methods to overcome diplomatic and operational constraints. The agency’s report serves as a reminder of the enduring challenge posed by state-sponsored intelligence activities, even in an era of heightened vigilance and international isolation for Moscow.
As Finland and its neighbors continue to integrate into NATO’s defense architecture, their counterintelligence agencies are expected to remain at the forefront of efforts to counter these evolving threats. The challenge lies in adapting quickly to Moscow’s shifting tactics while bolstering societal awareness and resilience against espionage activities disguised as legitimate professional or academic pursuits.
