Netanyahu lost his majority. Eisenkot still lacks a government. With as many as 19 seats, Israel’s Arab parties may hold the power both camps refuse to acknowledge.
Israel’s election has weakened Benjamin Netanyahu’s governing coalition without clearly transferring power to Gadi Eisenkot. Exit polls leave both blocs short of the 61 seats required to govern, turning what was presented as a national verdict into another struggle over coalition arithmetic.
The most consequential development may not be the performance of either leader. It is the projected rise of Israel’s Arab parties.
Netanyahu lost his majority, not necessarily power
Updated exit polls placed Netanyahu’s bloc at approximately 51–52 seats and the principal opposition at 49–51. Likud remained the largest individual party, ahead of Eisenkot’s Yashar.
These projections represent a substantial retreat for Netanyahu’s outgoing coalition, which held 68 seats. But losing a parliamentary majority does not automatically remove a prime minister.
Netanyahu remains caretaker while votes are counted and coalition negotiations proceed. If Eisenkot cannot assemble an alternative majority, Netanyahu could remain in office for weeks or months—and possibly through another election.
Early official returns initially appeared stronger for Netanyahu than the exit polls. Those figures covered only a minority of ballot boxes and shifted as counting expanded, demonstrating why partial results should not be treated as a national projection. Military, diplomatic and other special ballots are also counted later.
Arab turnout transformed the arithmetic
The Joint List and Ra’am were projected to secure a combined 18–19 seats, potentially their strongest representation in the Knesset. Overall turnout reached 77.7 percent—the highest in more than two decades—while reported Arab participation rose sharply.
Those seats could prevent either Jewish political bloc from governing alone.
Yet Eisenkot has resisted forming a coalition dependent on Arab parties. Netanyahu has likewise rejected such reliance. This creates an extraordinary contradiction: Arab citizens participated in large numbers, but the leading candidates remain unwilling to translate that participation into governing influence.
A minority government supported externally by Arab lawmakers remains mathematically possible. Politically, it would expose Eisenkot to accusations from the right that his government lacked a “Zionist majority”—language already central to the post-election contest.
Three difficult routes remain
Israel now faces three plausible outcomes.
The first is another Netanyahu government, requiring him to recover defectors or persuade parties outside his declared bloc to join him.
The second is an Eisenkot-led government enabled by Arab parties through formal participation, external support or abstention during a confidence vote.
The third is a unity government bringing Netanyahu’s Likud together with Eisenkot or another opposition partner. Eisenkot has rejected serving under Netanyahu, while Netanyahu’s far-right allies strongly oppose such an arrangement.
If all three routes fail, Israel could return to the polls.
WARYATV Assessment
The election has produced a political rejection without a governing replacement. Netanyahu suffered a serious setback, but Eisenkot has not yet demonstrated that he can convert opposition strength into power.
The deeper test now belongs to Israel’s political system. It can acknowledge Arab electoral participation, construct a difficult unity arrangement or remain trapped in repeated elections.
For Somaliland, the deadlock argues for patience. Recognition remains Israeli state policy, but major new agreements may slow while coalition negotiations continue. Hargeisa should maintain engagement across Israeli parties and avoid treating either Netanyahu’s survival or Eisenkot’s rise as settled.
Israel has counted its voters. It has not yet identified its government.
