The insidious effects of Russian disinformation campaigns across Europe have grown increasingly evident, as evidenced by a wave of cloned news sites that mimic trusted media outlets to mislead audiences. Using convincing visual similarities and familiar news formats, these websites have been targeting countries such as Poland, Ukraine, and Germany, generating and spreading Euroskeptic, anti-Ukrainian, and pro-Russian narratives. These websites, like one that mimicked Poland’s national broadcaster Polskie Radio but with a misleading domain extension, have sown confusion among readers, demonstrating the sophistication of the “Doppelganger” campaign.
According to the International Press Institute (IPI) and the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), these doppelganger sites form part of a persistent two-year disinformation operation by Russian agents. The U.S. Department of Justice, which has seized 32 domains implicated in such operations, attributes these deceptive sites to Russian “foreign malign influence campaigns.” Experts warn that such efforts have become more subtle, especially as the campaign now employs artificial intelligence to create false audio and video clips of well-known journalists, further muddying the media waters.
Camille Magnissalis, who monitors press freedom violations for EFJ, describes how these disinformation strategies “integrate into the media landscape and have impact.” The narratives promoted on these sites are often amplified through social media channels, particularly Facebook, where bot accounts and fake profiles spread misinformation rapidly. This platform’s prominence in Ukraine, where over half the population relies on it for news, has made it a potent tool for the dissemination of doppelganger disinformation. The information conveyed is often region-specific, delivered in the language of the target country, which significantly raises the likelihood of acceptance among local audiences.
The tactics of these campaigns have shifted since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, moving beyond language barriers to tailor content to foreign audiences in their native languages. Karol Luczka of IPI points out that while Russian disinformation was historically limited to the Russian language, it has now expanded its reach, adapting its approach for maximum influence.
Content often aligns with three primary narratives: that Ukraine is losing the war, that it faces resource depletion, or that its leadership is corrupt. Luczka adds that the credibility gap created by these narratives fosters a “climate of chaos” among readers, undermining trust in traditional news sources across Europe.
Fake news stories posted on these cloned sites cover a range of topics but are specifically designed to stoke skepticism towards the European Union, NATO, and Ukraine. The deployment of crypto transactions to secure domains obscures the identity of the purchasers, adding another layer of complexity to the detection and mitigation of such campaigns.
The Russian government has not responded to requests for comment, and European governments have limited tools for countering this increasingly decentralized campaign. In France, cloned sites impersonated the French daily Le Monde to influence sentiment ahead of the 2022 presidential elections. Ahead of Poland’s recent elections, disinformation surged on cloned Polish sites, making clear that European elections are a ripe target for influence efforts.
Social media giants, particularly Meta, are facing mounting pressure to mitigate the impact of these disinformation campaigns. The European Commission has urged platforms to improve disinformation tracking, particularly in light of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, tech companies continue to struggle with the breadth of the problem as new domains appear frequently, sometimes faster than they can be detected and removed.
