Nearly two years into Israel’s campaign against Hamas, whispers of an alternative power are surfacing in Gaza: small, armed militias declaring themselves enemies of Hamas. These groups, often tied to Bedouin clans and former security officials, are drawing the attention of regional media — and fueling speculation about whether Israel is quietly backing them.
The first name to surface was Yasser Abu Shabab, a tribal strongman from a Bedouin clan, accused by Arab media of creating “collaborator villages” under Israeli protection in Gaza’s southeast. He was followed more recently by Husam al-Astal, a former Palestinian security officer once sentenced to death by Hamas for alleged ties to Israel. Astal now commands a few hundred fighters near Khan Younis, one kilometer from a humanitarian zone. “I am responsible for the humanitarian area in Khan Younis,” he declared in an interview, presenting himself as an alternative to Hamas rule.
The Long War Journal reported last month on another emerging militia calling itself the Counterterrorism Strike Force (CSF), which announced its formation in August. “In response to the ongoing repression practiced by Hamas, we announce the formation of the Counterterrorism Strike Force,” the group declared online. Analysts say it is among a handful of militias that appear to be supported, if not outright managed, by Israel’s army and Shin Bet.
Yet questions remain. Are these men genuine resistance figures, or little more than local strongmen exploiting the chaos? Their numbers are small — hundreds, not thousands — and their reach limited. Hamas still commands thousands of fighters in Gaza City alone, and controls the lives of nearly two million Gazans. Without broad public backing, these militias risk being seen not as liberators but as collaborators.
History provides cautionary parallels. The U.S. once turned to Sunni tribes during the “Awakening” in Iraq, briefly weakening al-Qaeda in the mid-2000s. But when support dried up, the experiment collapsed. Gaza may be heading down a similar path.
For now, these militias serve a tactical purpose: helping Israel secure slivers of territory, patrolling humanitarian zones, and giving the appearance of local opposition to Hamas. But the bigger question is whether they can evolve into something more enduring — a force capable of governing or filling the vacuum if Hamas is eventually broken.
So far, the answer is no. Nearly two years and multiple IDF offensives later, Hamas has proven resilient, and the “day after” plan for Gaza remains murky. A few hundred armed tribesmen cannot replace 20,000 entrenched fighters — nor can they feed or govern a displaced population. Unless given political legitimacy, resources, and real popular support, these anti-Hamas groups may remain more symbol than solution.
