Kulmiye’s Long Road Back
Kulmiye still has the machinery of a national party. The question is whether it has learned why Somaliland removed it from power.
Can Kulmiye Rebuild After 14 Years in Government?
Kulmiye remains too established to be dismissed, but too associated with its years in power to recover through nostalgia alone. Its path back requires more than reorganizing committees and selecting a presidential candidate. The party must explain why voters removed it—and demonstrate that it has changed.
Kulmiye governed Somaliland from 2010 until President Muse Bihi Abdi’s defeat in November 2024. Bihi received 34.81 percent of the presidential vote against Abdirahman Irro’s 63.92 percent. In the simultaneous political-party election, Kulmiye finished behind both WADDANI and the newly established KAAH Party.
The result was not political extinction. It was a demand for renewal.
Kulmiye still possesses valuable machinery
Fourteen years in government gave Kulmiye experienced organizers, regional networks, former ministers, local supporters and an identifiable political brand. Those assets matter in Somaliland, where building a national party structure requires years of negotiation, financing and grassroots organization.
The party has also moved early to define its next contest. In July 2026, its Central Committee selected former interior minister and party chairman Mohamed Kahin Ahmed as its presidential candidate for 2029, reportedly alongside Dr. Mohamed Mohamoud “Shiine” as his running mate.
An early ticket gives Kulmiye time to organize. It also creates a risk: if the leadership looks like a continuation of the government voters rejected, three years of campaigning may only reinforce the party’s old image.
It must confront the reasons for defeat
Kulmiye’s loss followed several damaging controversies. The 2022 extension of Bihi’s presidential term produced political confrontation and deadly protests. The conflict in eastern Sool weakened public confidence in the government’s security and political judgment. Voters also faced economic pressure, unemployment and frustration with prolonged rule.
A credible comeback requires an internal review that names failures rather than blaming voters, opposition alliances or hostile media. What decisions were wrong? Which institutions became too centralized? Why did the party lose ground outside its strongest districts?
Without honest answers, “renewal” becomes a change of campaign posters.
Opposition work will determine credibility
Kulmiye cannot rebuild by waiting for WADDANI to fail. It must perform the daily work of opposition: examining budgets, monitoring government promises, proposing legislation and producing alternatives on food security, employment, taxation, education and territorial governance.
It must also compete with KAAH, which finished ahead of it in the political-party vote and is increasingly presenting itself as the most aggressive critic of Irro’s administration.
Kulmiye’s advantage is governing experience. Its disadvantage is that every criticism of WADDANI invites a question about why Kulmiye did not solve the same problem during 14 years in office.
Internal democracy is the first test
The party’s earlier disputes over congress timing exposed tensions between institutional rules and leadership control. WARYATV reported that the political-parties regulator intervened after an attempted postponement was challenged as unlawful.
A party asking voters to return it to government must first show that it can govern itself transparently. Competitive internal elections, financial accountability and meaningful roles for younger members would provide stronger evidence of reform than public declarations.
WARYATV Assessment
Kulmiye can rebuild because its organization, history and remaining voter base are substantial. But recovery depends on whether it becomes a reformed opposition party or merely a government-in-exile waiting for public disappointment with WADDANI.
Its strongest argument cannot be that Somaliland was better before 2024. It must explain what it learned after losing power.
Parties survive defeat when they treat it as information. They decline when they treat it as an injustice.
