Nato’s latest summit in The Hague delivered the most ambitious spending pledge in the alliance’s history: member states aim to devote five per cent of national output to defence and security by 2035.
The commitment underlines a dawning realisation that shuttle diplomacy, condemnations of Vladimir Putin and Steve Witkoff’s back-and-forth peace missions will not be enough to end the war in Ukraine.
More fundamentally, it signals Nato’s growing concern that Russia could test the alliance directly within the next five years, a warning voiced by Secretary-General Mark Rutte.
From Moscow’s perspective, a direct strike on Nato territory remains unlikely unless Western forces deploy to Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s more probable next move is against a non-allied post-Soviet state such as Moldova. Yet everything Nato does—or fails to do—between now and the end of the decade will shape Putin’s calculus. Money alone will not deter him. Strategy will, and any successful strategy must start with a clear grasp of how Russia wages war.
Modern Russian doctrine, formulated by the General Staff and steeped in Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s concept of indirect approaches, seeks to bypass an enemy’s strengths and exploit its vulnerabilities.
In any future confrontation with Nato, Moscow will try to seize the initiative at the outset, undermining the alliance’s decision-making “kill chain” by targeting its reliance on space assets, command-and-control nodes and precision networks.
If Nato is to remove the incentives for such a campaign, it must shore up its weakest links. Space infrastructure must be protected against Russia’s growing arsenal of counter-space weapons—jammers, lasers, orbital interceptors and anti-satellite missiles—as well as its reported programme to field a nuclear-powered space system.
Critical civilian infrastructure must be hardened against cyber sabotage, given Moscow’s proven ability to combine cyber strikes with kinetic operations.
The alliance’s undersea communications cables and energy pipelines, increasingly at risk from the clandestine activities of Russia’s deep-sea research directorate, need more robust surveillance and protection.
Counter-intelligence also demands a step change. Russian espionage aimed at destabilising Europe has risen sharply since the invasion of Ukraine, with sabotage plots uncovered from Berlin to Warsaw and London.
Neutralising those networks before they can act is essential. Finally, Nato must close the production and manpower gap. Russia’s war economy now turns out more artillery shells in three months than Europe can manage in a year.
On top of scaling up weapons output, Western capitals may have to consider more demanding forms of national service if they are serious about matching Russia in a protracted conflict.
The alliance still has time to prepare, but the window is closing fast. Ukraine’s heavy sacrifices should serve as a warning that tomorrow’s security cannot be bought solely with bigger budgets or smarter technology. Only a coherent, forward-looking strategy—rooted in an unblinking assessment of Russia’s playbook—can convince the Kremlin that a fresh offensive anywhere in Europe would be a gamble it cannot win.
