Analysis: U.S.-Backed Warning Says Al-Shabaab’s Advance Now Threatens Mogadishu as Somalia’s Federal Order Fractures.
A new assessment from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies warns that al-Shabaab’s sweeping gains across central Somalia have brought the militant group closer to Mogadishu than at any point in more than a decade, raising the once-unthinkable prospect that the capital could fall if the political crisis deepens and security forces continue to erode.
The brief — authored by Horn of Africa analyst Matt Bryden — argues that al-Shabaab’s advances have coincided with a rapid breakdown of cooperation between Villa Somalia and federal member states, creating a security and political vacuum that the militants have exploited with increasing speed.
According to the report, al-Shabaab now controls roughly a third of Somali territory and has pushed to within 50 kilometers of the capital after reclaiming nearly all areas lost during the 2023 government offensive.
Diplomats have reportedly evacuated nonessential staff to Nairobi as militants set up roadblocks on key approaches to Mogadishu, pausing only to consolidate control in Middle Shabelle.
An October suicide raid on the National Intelligence and Security Agency — less than a kilometer from the presidential compound — underscored what the brief calls “the capital’s extraordinary vulnerability.”
The report portrays Somalia’s security forces as exhausted and overstretched. Defense officials recently acknowledged that up to 15,000 soldiers have been killed or wounded in three years.
The army’s reliance on elite units, chronic corruption and clan favoritism, and the collapse of momentum following last year’s offensive have left the government struggling to hold territory without foreign backing.
Even that support is faltering. The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission, AUSSOM, has received only a fraction of its budget, carrying more than $100 million in arrears.
Without emergency funding, the mission may be forced to retreat to guarding only the airport, port, and Mogadishu’s diplomatic enclave — leaving the capital exposed.
The security crisis is mirrored by a political rupture that Bryden describes as the unraveling of Somalia’s federal bargain. The Provisional Constitution envisioned power-sharing between Mogadishu and member states, anchored by four major port economies.
But successive presidents have concentrated power at the center, a trend the brief says reached its peak under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s second term, with controversial constitutional amendments and political maneuvering ahead of the 2026 elections.
Puntland and Jubaland have suspended cooperation, withdrawn recognition of federal authority, and warned that any extension of Hassan Sheikh’s term would trigger a constitutional crisis.
Opposition groups say the presidency’s current trajectory risks splitting the country into rival governments — one centered in Mogadishu, another around the more stable administrations in Puntland and Jubaland.
The report warns that even without a battlefield takeover, Somalia could drift toward an illiberal Islamist state. Political Islamists — including factions linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi movements — already occupy key positions across government and religious institutions.
Al-I’tisaam’s influence over major businesses, religious networks, and parts of the security apparatus is growing, while new constitutional amendments shaped by Salafi clerics could undermine human rights protections.
Foreign involvement is further amplifying domestic fractures. Qatar and Türkiye back Islamist-aligned leaders in Mogadishu and have become deeply embedded in the capital’s security and infrastructure.
Türkiye now manages Mogadishu’s port and airport, trains elite security units, and has signed extensive maritime and energy deals — including plans for a missile-testing and space-launch site on the coast.
The UAE, Ethiopia, and Kenya, meanwhile, maintain closer ties with Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland. Emirati-managed ports at Berbera and Bosaaso have strengthened regional economies, while Ethiopian and Kenyan security forces depend on their northern partners for border stability.
Somaliland — long operating as a de facto independent state — stands at the center of this geopolitical map.
The brief notes that if southern Somalia collapses further or falls to al-Shabaab, international pressure to revisit Somaliland’s status may intensify, echoing a 2005 African Union mission that described its case for recognition as “historically unique and self-justified.”
The report outlines two potential paths. One is an emergency political reset: a government of national unity, a return to the original constitutional text, an indirect election by May 2026, and a revival of the security architecture that places federal member state forces and community militias at the center of the counterinsurgency.
The alternative is a collapse-and-containment scenario in which al-Shabaab captures Mogadishu — along with its port revenues and military hardware — forcing Puntland, Jubaland, Hiiraan, and allied administrations to form a provisional government elsewhere with backing from Ethiopia, Kenya, the UAE, and Western partners.
The brief concludes that Somalia’s fate will be determined less by what happens on the battlefield and more by whether political leaders can salvage the federal compact. Without cooperation, it warns, the black flag Somalia fought for decades to remove from its capital could return — this time backed by the country’s own fragmentation.
