The Houthis and Al-Shabaab do not need to share an ideology. Weapons, money and military expertise may be enough to connect two wars across the Gulf of Aden.
No evidence proves an imminent attack on Berbera—but waiting for one before strengthening Somaliland’s maritime defences would be a costly mistake.
Houthis and Al-Shabaab: A Transactional Alliance Is Becoming a Two-Shore Security Threat
By WARYATV Intelligence Desk | waryatv@waryatv.com
The developing relationship between Yemen’s Houthis and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab does not resemble a formal military alliance. The two movements follow different religious traditions, pursue different political objectives and answer to separate command structures.
That distinction is important—but it should not create false reassurance.
Evidence cited by United Nations experts and researchers at The Century Foundation suggests that the relationship has progressed beyond occasional arms deals. Reported cooperation now includes weapons trafficking, movement of personnel, drone and explosives training, technical assistance and logistical support across the Gulf of Aden.
The emerging threat is therefore not ideological unity. It is the construction of a durable marketplace in which money, weapons, expertise and access can move between armed groups on opposite shores of one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.
What the public evidence shows
A 2025 UN Panel of Experts report described a developing relationship involving small arms, light weapons and training. A separate UN investigation cited information from a Somali Al-Shabaab member who reportedly facilitated the movement of nearly 400 Somalis to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen for military and ideological instruction.
The same report said authorities were investigating about 70 Somali nationals allegedly involved in transporting Houthi-supplied weapons into Somalia. These figures came partly from official sources and testimony collected by investigators; they should not be treated as independently verified counts of trained fighters.
The Century Foundation’s August 2026 study, written by Peter Salisbury, Nadwa Al-Dawsari and Jay Bahadur, reported that Houthi specialists had travelled to areas associated with Al-Shabaab and that training allegedly covered improvised explosive devices, drones and weapons maintenance. The researchers concluded that the Houthis were trying to turn themselves from an Iranian-supported “spoke” into a regional hub capable of influencing armed actors in Africa.
More recent reporting has cited security specialists who say the Houthis have sold weapons to Al-Shabaab and trained fighters in drone and explosive operations. The exact scale remains contested, however, and some specialists caution that the relationship may still be smaller than intelligence reporting suggests.
Houthi officials and analysts close to the movement deny that such a relationship exists. They challenge the reliability of UN reporting and characterize some of the underlying information as hostile Saudi or Western intelligence.
The denials deserve attribution. They do not, however, erase the accumulated evidence of weapons moving between Yemen and Somalia or the documented concern expressed by UN sanctions monitors.
Ideology is not the barrier it appears to be
Al-Shabaab belongs to Al-Qaeda’s Sunni extremist network. The Houthis emerged from Yemen’s Zaidi Shia community and operate within Iran’s wider regional security orbit.
These ideological differences make a unified political project improbable. But armed organizations do not need to agree on theology to exchange weapons, money or technical knowledge.
Al-Shabaab possesses revenue, smuggling connections and territory. The Houthis possess combat experience, access to increasingly advanced weapons and knowledge gained from years of missile, drone and maritime operations. Each side has something the other can use.
The most credible assessment is therefore that the relationship remains transactional—but is becoming more structured. Personal contacts, training pipelines and trafficking routes can survive even when the political conditions that created them change.
The Gulf of Aden could become one connected battlespace
The strategic danger begins when separate conflicts become operationally linked.
The Houthis can pressure shipping from Yemen’s coastline and islands near Bab el-Mandeb. Al-Shabaab operates inside Somalia and has access to coastal smuggling networks. If more sophisticated drones, explosives or maritime weapons move into Somalia, security forces could face threats extending beyond conventional bombings and ground attacks.
The result would not necessarily be coordinated attacks directed by one command centre. A looser network may be harder to dismantle because it does not depend on a single headquarters or formal chain of command.
The Century Foundation also examined possible Houthi activity or access in Djibouti, Sudan and Eritrea. Some of these allegations remain inconclusive. Open-source evidence is strongest regarding Somalia and arms-trafficking routes; claims about operational infrastructure elsewhere require further verification.
Somaliland cannot treat this as somebody else’s war
Somaliland sits directly across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen. Berbera, its commercial port, international airport and economic corridor are becoming more strategically valuable as regional shipping routes face growing pressure.
There is no public evidence establishing that the Houthis and Al-Shabaab are preparing a joint attack against Somaliland or Berbera. Yet the development of a two-shore weapons and training network changes Somaliland’s risk environment.
Hargeisa should strengthen maritime surveillance, coastal policing, port inspection and counter-drone preparedness. Authorities also need better coordination with Djibouti, Puntland and international naval forces monitoring the Gulf of Aden.
Small fishing vessels and traditional dhows cannot be treated automatically as security threats; coastal communities depend on them. Screening must be intelligence-led, using vessel histories, unusual routes, cargo discrepancies and financial information—not collective suspicion.
Berbera also requires a continuity plan covering shipping disruption, aviation security, fuel supplies and essential imports. A port does not need to be attacked directly to suffer. Higher insurance premiums, diverted vessels or a single credible threat could affect commercial traffic.
WARYATV Assessment
The evidence does not yet establish a unified Houthi–Al-Shabaab command or an African version of Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Claims of a fully developed regional alliance go beyond what public information can presently support.
But dismissing the relationship because the groups differ ideologically would be equally mistaken.
The immediate danger is capability transfer: Al-Shabaab acquiring better drones, explosives and weapons-maintenance skills while the Houthis gain money, smuggling access and influence along the African shore.
That would connect Yemen’s war more directly to Somalia’s insurgency and make the Gulf of Aden a single security theatre. For Somaliland, the warning is clear: the infrastructure protecting Berbera, the coastline and essential supply routes must be strengthened before a transactional relationship produces an operational surprise.
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