As Juba and opposition forces mobilize, international monitors warn that South Sudan’s unity government is collapsing — a crisis that could redraw East Africa’s fragile balance.

An oversight body tasked with monitoring South Sudan’s 2018 peace agreement has issued a stark warning: both the government and opposition are recruiting new fighters, abducting children, and arming for what could be a return to full-scale war. The findings — presented Tuesday in Juba by the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) — mark the most serious alarm yet that the country’s tenuous peace is unraveling.

At the heart of the report lies a constitutional crisis with regional and geopolitical stakes. The government’s June decision to recruit 4,000 new soldiers and open a new training center violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the 2018 accord — which requires a unified national army before elections can be held.

Opposition factions loyal to former vice president Riek Machar, meanwhile, are accused of mobilizing their own forces and abducting children into service. Together, these actions erode what remains of the fragile power-sharing framework that ended South Sudan’s last civil war.

The RJMEC’s interim chairman, George Aggrey Owinow, warned bluntly that “if the current challenges are not urgently addressed, there is a high risk of reversal of all the gains already made.” His remarks underscore fears that the Kiir–Machar unity government — extended twice beyond its initial mandate — has entered a dangerous limbo: too weak to implement reforms, yet too divided to hold credible elections.

The government’s response was strikingly dismissive. Cabinet Affairs Minister Martin Elia Lomuro sought to calm fears, insisting the situation “will not derail the peace process.” Yet reports from the U.N. and humanitarian agencies suggest otherwise: civilian casualties have risen nearly 60% since last year, more than 320,000 people have been displaced, and humanitarian access incidents have doubled.

The immediate flashpoint is the prosecution of Machar, now under house arrest and facing charges that include terrorism and crimes against humanity — accusations he denies. His allies say the charges are politically motivated, warning that they risk dismantling the balance of power that has kept the peace deal barely intact. The RJMEC has called for his release, arguing that a fair and inclusive process is essential to prevent renewed conflict.

But the deeper issue is structural. The transitional government’s mandate, designed to integrate rival forces and restore a single national chain of command, remains incomplete. Instead, both sides are rearming — a constitutional breach that undermines state legitimacy.

Regional actors, particularly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which brokered the peace, face growing pressure to intervene decisively.

South Sudan’s instability is not just a domestic affair. Its collapse would reverberate across a volatile region already stretched by wars in Sudan and the Congo.

A renewed conflict could send hundreds of thousands fleeing into neighboring Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, destabilizing borders and humanitarian corridors.

The RJMEC’s report is more than an administrative rebuke — it is a final warning that South Sudan’s peace deal is disintegrating from within. Without swift international mediation, enforcement of disarmament provisions, and constitutional clarity on power-sharing, the world’s youngest nation may once again slide into war — a failure not just of leadership in Juba, but of the international system that pledged to help it stand.

Al-Shabaab has become al-Qaida’s most lucrative franchise, generating as much as $200 million a year through a system of forced taxation, extortion, and illicit trade that now underwrites a growing insurgency across Somalia, according to a new counterterrorism assessment from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

The report, The Global State of al-Qa‘ida 24 Years After 9/11, describes the group’s financial network as “sophisticated and institutionalized,” rivaling the Somali state in reach and efficiency.

Revenue from road levies, smuggling, and remittance skimming sustains an estimated 18,000 fighters, enabling the militants to retake strategic ground in central and southern Somalia, including Adan Yabaal—a key crossroads northeast of Mogadishu.

Residents and traders say payments, often framed as zakat, or Islamic alms, are demanded at every level of commerce.

Transporters, herders, farmers, and importers pay fees simply to move goods. In many regions, businesses find Al-Shabaab’s parallel system more reliable than federal or regional authorities, even as it funds the group’s campaign of violence.

Flush with cash, the militants have regained momentum after early setbacks during President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s 2022 offensive.

Their capture of Adan Yabaal has reopened a vital corridor linking Mogadishu to central regions, turning the town into a staging hub for fighters and supplies.

The setback highlights persistent weaknesses in Somalia’s security forces, which struggle to hold territory despite support from clan militias and African Union troops.

The United States has carried out 71 airstrikes in Somalia this year, targeting training camps and leadership compounds, while the U.S.-Gulf Terrorist Financing Targeting Center froze assets tied to 15 Somali financiers in April.

Somali authorities have also tightened regulations on informal hawala networks and frozen hundreds of accounts linked to suspected tax collectors since 2025.

Yet the CTC warns that shifting Western priorities toward great-power competition has given al-Qaida affiliates in Africa greater room to operate.

For ordinary Somalis, the result is a landscape of overlapping demands—government levies, clan militia fees, and Al-Shabaab’s relentless extortion—that leave traders and families caught between fragile state institutions and militant coercion.

The report concludes that while al-Qaida’s senior leadership has eroded, its African affiliates, particularly Al-Shabaab, now serve as the financial backbone of the global network.

In Somalia, the militants’ ability to tax, collect, and spend at scale has made financing not just a tool of insurgency but the core of their war effort.

Washington’s Dilemma: Ditch Somalia for a Strategic Somaliland Base?

The Swedish Defence Research Agency’s recent report paints Somaliland’s recognition as a destabilizing gamble, but this framing underestimates both Somaliland’s record and the shifting global order. Far from opening a “Pandora’s box,” recognition would reward stability, secure a strategic ally, and serve long-term U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa.

The Stability Myth Exposed
For three decades, the international community has clung to the fiction of a “One Somalia” policy — hoping against reality that Mogadishu could unify a fractured state.

That experiment has failed. Somalia remains engulfed in clan divisions, corruption, and the enduring threat of al-Shabaab. Somaliland, by contrast, has built democratic institutions, organized peaceful transfers of power, and provided a level of stability unmatched anywhere in the region.

To argue that recognition would “weaken counterterrorism” is to ignore the fact that Mogadishu’s instability itself fuels extremism. Strengthening Somaliland gives the West a firmer foothold against al-Shabaab.

African Union Fears Overblown
The AU’s opposition is rooted less in principle than in fear. The notion that Somaliland would trigger a wave of secession ignores its unique history: a former British protectorate that entered — and then lawfully withdrew from — a voluntary union.

Somaliland’s claim is not a breakaway rebellion but a restoration of sovereignty.

Treating it as equivalent to other separatist movements is a category error. Recognition here would establish clarity, not chaos.

Strategic Imperative for the West
Geography alone makes Somaliland indispensable. The port of Berbera sits at the gateway to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a lifeline for global shipping and energy flows.

China already operates a base in Djibouti — right next to the U.S.’s only permanent base in Africa. Continuing to ignore Somaliland hands Beijing leverage. Recognizing it would open the way for U.S. basing rights, enhanced maritime security, and secure access to critical minerals at a time when global supply chains are under siege.

The Cost of Delay
Washington and Brussels risk repeating the mistakes of the past by waiting for consensus that will never come. Every year of hesitation drives Somaliland closer to alternative partners — from Taiwan to potential overtures by Beijing itself.

The West must decide whether to treat Somaliland as an opportunity or as a bargaining chip sacrificed to maintain illusions in Mogadishu.

Recognition as Realism
Somaliland does not need to prove its viability — it has already done so for 34 years. What remains is for the international community to abandon outdated frameworks and recognize what is obvious on the ground: Somaliland is a functioning state that has earned its place among nations.

Recognition would not destabilize the Horn; it would anchor it.

Somalia’s corruption index drops again, reinforcing concerns over governance, security, and economic stability.

Somalia has once again been ranked among the world’s most corrupt countries, according to Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). With a score of just 9 out of 100, the country slid further down the rankings, securing the 179th spot out of 180 nations, second only to South Sudan.

Despite government pledges to tackle systemic corruption, the reality paints a grim picture: public funds disappear into the hands of officials, judicial institutions lack the power to prosecute wrongdoing, and bribery remains the norm in every sector. The security forces, already battling Al-Shabaab insurgents, have seen their budgets gutted by corrupt officials, further destabilizing the nation.

Anti-corruption measures, such as the establishment of the Office of the Auditor General and procurement oversight reforms, have done little to halt the tide of fraud and embezzlement. Political interference ensures that high-profile figures remain untouchable, while millions in international aid vanish without accountability.

Beyond governance, corruption is crippling Somalia’s economy and exacerbating the effects of climate change. Donor funds meant for disaster relief are siphoned off, and critical infrastructure projects remain incomplete. Meanwhile, foreign investors remain wary of engaging with a nation where fraud and mismanagement are the status quo.

Somalia’s worsening ranking reflects a broader trend in the region, with Sudan and South Sudan also among the worst offenders. Ethiopia and Kenya, while performing slightly better, continue to struggle with deep-rooted corruption, particularly in procurement and law enforcement.

With corruption now deeply embedded in Somalia’s political and economic fabric, the future remains uncertain. Without drastic action, the country risks further descent into instability, ensuring that development, security, and public trust remain elusive.

Report highlights a significant shipment of sodium perchlorate destined for Iranian missile programs, raising international concerns.

Iranian cargo ships are reportedly transporting over 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Iran, a shipment that has raised alarms among Western security officials. Sodium perchlorate, a critical ingredient for producing ammonium perchlorate, is essential for solid-fuel missile propellants. The shipment could significantly bolster Iran’s missile capabilities.

Details of the Shipment
According to reports, the Iranian vessels Golbon and Jairan are set to carry 56 containers of sodium perchlorate to Bandar Abbas, a key port controlled by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Western officials estimate that the shipment could produce approximately 960 tons of ammonium perchlorate, enough to fuel 260 mid-range missiles.

The Golbon departed Daishan Island in the East China Sea earlier this week, carrying 34 containers. The Jairan is expected to depart in February with 22 additional containers. Both ships, flying Iranian flags, will make the journey directly to southern Iran without any planned stops, according to vessel tracking data.

International Concerns
Ammonium perchlorate is controlled under the Missile Technology Export Control Regime (MTCR), an international framework aimed at preventing the proliferation of missile technologies capable of delivering nuclear weapons. This shipment highlights longstanding concerns over Iran’s missile development, particularly given the IRGC’s involvement.

The United States and its allies have historically criticized China for supporting Iran’s military programs. Experts note that China has provided extensive assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile development since the 1990s, including technology, training, and parts. This relationship is believed to further geopolitical goals, such as strengthening ties between Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing in opposition to U.S. influence.

China’s Stance
While the Chinese government has not commented on the shipment, Beijing’s embassy in the U.S. reiterated China’s commitment to Middle East stability and a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. However, analysts view this shipment as part of a broader strategy, including China’s purchase of discounted Iranian crude oil and potential clandestine support for Iran’s missile program to assist Russia in its war effort in Ukraine.

This development underscores the complexities of enforcing international sanctions and export controls. The shipment of missile fuel chemicals from China to Iran not only raises questions about Tehran’s ambitions but also highlights Beijing’s role in enabling its ally’s military capabilities.

As the Golbon and Jairan continue their voyages, international observers will likely focus on whether this shipment signals a broader shift in regional power dynamics and the global enforcement of non-proliferation agreements.

UN Data Reveals Sharp Increase in Human Trafficking Post-Pandemic

Human trafficking has seen a significant resurgence, with cases rising 25% above pre-pandemic levels in 2022, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This alarming trend, outlined in the latest Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, highlights how conflicts, climate change, and global crises exacerbate vulnerabilities exploited by traffickers.

Criminal networks are adapting their methods, increasingly coercing victims into forced labor and cyberfraud. Women and girls, however, remain disproportionately targeted for sexual exploitation, accounting for over 60% of cases involving female victims. Children make up a staggering 38% of detected victims, with boys often subjected to forced labor, criminal activities, and begging.

Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for the largest number of trafficking victims globally, with 26% originating from the region. However, the sharpest increases in cases have been detected in North America and Western and Southern Europe, largely fueled by migration flows. Unaccompanied minors arriving in these regions are particularly vulnerable, often falling prey to traffickers.

While improved detection methods may partially explain the rise in identified cases, the report suggests that the overall prevalence of trafficking is increasing. Organized crime groups continue to exploit economic and social upheavals, capitalizing on displaced populations and vulnerable communities.

The international community must prioritize counter-trafficking efforts, focusing on strengthening protections for vulnerable populations, dismantling criminal networks, and addressing the root causes of trafficking, such as poverty, migration pressures, and gender-based violence. The UN report serves as a stark reminder of the urgent need for coordinated global action to combat this escalating crisis.

The Brenthurst Foundation has released its comprehensive report on Somaliland’s 2024 presidential and political organizations elections, held on November 13. The elections marked the ninth competitive poll since Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991. The mission highlighted the significant strides Somaliland has made in fostering democratic practices in a volatile region, while also addressing the logistical and political hurdles that accompanied this year’s elections.

Historical Context: A Legacy of Resilience

Since its self-declared independence, Somaliland has emerged as an outlier in East Africa, cultivating a functional democratic system despite the lack of international recognition. Its historical journey—from the destruction wrought by Somalia’s Siad Barre regime to the establishment of an inclusive multiparty system—has earned it a reputation as a beacon of stability in a tumultuous region.

Somaliland’s three-party system, enshrined in its constitution, continues to serve as a cornerstone of its democratic framework. However, this election faced heightened scrutiny due to political tensions stemming from delayed polls and agreements with neighboring Ethiopia.

Key Features of the 2024 Election

This year’s elections were distinct in several respects:

1. Simultaneous Presidential and Party Elections: For the first time, elections determined both the presidency and the recognition of political parties, with seven new associations vying to replace the incumbent three-party slate.
2. Delayed Timeline: Opposition parties criticized President Muuse Biixi Cabdi for extending his term, initially scheduled to end in 2022, alleging a deliberate delay to maintain power.
3. Technological Advancements: The deployment of IRIS biometric verification at over 1,000 polling stations marked a significant technological milestone, although its coverage remained limited to urban areas.

Despite these challenges, 1.2 million registered voters participated in the process, with more than 13,000 officials facilitating the election across 2,648 stations.

Election Day Observations

The Brenthurst Foundation deployed 20 international observers across four key districts: Hargeisa, Borama, Burao, and Berbera, covering 26% of the electorate. Observers noted the following:

• Peaceful Conduct: Voting was largely orderly, with polling stations opening on time and being efficiently managed. The prominent participation of women, both as voters and officials, was a standout feature.
• Adherence to Procedures: Voter identification, ballot allocation, and counting processes were rigorously followed. Party agents actively monitored and verified results at polling stations.
• Technology in Action: The IRIS biometric system functioned effectively in most locations, with staff cross-checking entries against physical voter rolls to ensure accuracy.
• Security Challenges: Minor incidents of crowd control occurred in Hargeisa and Burao, requiring police intervention. However, these disruptions were swiftly managed, allowing voting to proceed.

Assessment and Credibility

The report lauded Somaliland’s electoral commission for conducting a transparent process despite limited financial and logistical resources. The elections were deemed “free, fair, and credible,” with improvements noted in areas such as voter verification, lighting, and the efficiency of counting compared to the 2021 elections.

However, the mission acknowledged areas for improvement, including the exclusion of underage voters, enhanced crowd control, and better accommodation for voters with disabilities.

Recommendations for Future Elections

The Brenthurst Foundation proposed 11 recommendations to strengthen Somaliland’s electoral process:

1. Maintain NEC Independence: Ensuring the commission’s impartiality remains critical.
2. Equal Treatment of Observers: Local observers should receive the same support as international missions.
3. Address Underage Voting: Voter rolls should be scrutinized to eliminate discrepancies.
4. Ban Election-Day Campaigning: A clear prohibition on politicking during voting would enhance integrity.
5. Expand Biometric Coverage: The IRIS system should be extended nationwide and supported with reliable power sources.
6. Improve Crowd Management: Better marshaling outside polling stations is essential to prevent crushes.
7. Enhance Transparency: Publishing polling station results on-site would align with global best practices.
8. Monitor Political Financing: Transparent reporting of funding sources is necessary to level the playing field.
9. Promote Policy-Based Campaigning: Candidates should focus on issues rather than identity-based politics.

Challenges and Regional Dynamics

Somaliland’s agreement with Ethiopia earlier this year to lease coastal land near Berbera sparked tensions, both domestically and with Somalia. The report highlighted concerns over external funding influencing opposition parties and the resulting destabilization of the political landscape. Despite these pressures, the election demonstrated Somaliland’s resilience and its commitment to democratic ideals.

Conclusion

The Brenthurst Foundation commended Somaliland for its achievements in holding credible elections under challenging circumstances. While external recognition of its independence remains elusive, Somaliland continues to set an example for democratic governance in the Horn of Africa. Strengthening electoral processes and addressing political tensions will be vital as the region looks to the future.

Africa’s port infrastructure has experienced significant growth, spurred by an estimated $15 billion in investments since 2005. These investments have allowed African ports to accommodate larger vessels and increase cargo throughput, with container traffic rising by nearly 50% from 2011 to 2021, according to the African Development Bank. Yet, despite these advancements, the continent’s inland logistics remain a significant hurdle to efficient supply chain operations, as highlighted by the Africa Finance Corporation’s 2024 “State of Africa’s Infrastructure” report.

Gabriel Sounouvou, a logistics and supply chain specialist, notes that while modernizing ports has led to improvements such as greater integration into the global supply chain and reduced corruption, these gains have not translated into more efficient movement of goods within Africa. The primary bottleneck lies in underdeveloped road and rail networks, which, despite port expansions, remain inadequate, unevenly distributed, and underutilized.

The poor quality of road networks is especially problematic. Sounouvou explains that many trucks are forced to navigate poor road corridors, causing severe delays. Goods transported from ports to landlocked countries often take more than 10 days to arrive instead of the three days that could be expected under better conditions. This logistical challenge is exacerbated in areas far from coastal ports, where the cost of doing business soars due to infrastructure deficits.

In addition to infrastructure, human factors also present significant challenges. Jonas Aryee, a maritime trade expert, points out that regulatory roadblocks such as customs checks, police stops, and border delays contribute to the high costs and inefficiency of transporting goods across African countries. These barriers, along with protectionist policies that safeguard domestic industries at the expense of regional trade cooperation, further stymie the development of a seamless continental logistics network.

According to the AFC study, Africa’s paved road network totals just 680,000 kilometers, a mere 10% of the road infrastructure found in India, despite Africa’s larger land area and comparable population size. This stark gap illustrates the lack of coordinated investment and infrastructure development across the continent. Experts argue that without a concerted effort from African nations to jointly invest in and manage cross-border highway networks, the potential benefits of port modernization will remain unfulfilled.

While inland infrastructure remains a critical issue, the momentum for port investment continues. Several new terminal projects are slated for development in countries such as Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ivory Coast. However, for these investments to translate into broader economic gains, African nations must address the chronic underdevelopment of road and rail systems that are vital for efficient logistics and trade integration.

Ultimately, the development of a more robust and interconnected transportation network—integrating ports, roads, and railways—is crucial for unlocking the full economic potential of Africa’s growing port infrastructure. Without it, Africa risks missing out on the opportunity to fully participate in the global supply chain, with inefficiencies continuing to hamper economic growth and regional trade.