The Second Chokepoint: Hormuz is already shaking markets. If the Red Sea follows, the shock doubles.
As the war between the United States, Israel and Iran deepens, a second, quieter front is emerging—one that could prove just as consequential for the global economy.
Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement is signaling restraint. But that restraint is strategic, not passive.
So far, the group has limited its role to missile and drone attacks against Israel, avoiding a return to sustained strikes on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. That decision stands out given the group’s past capability: between 2023 and 2025, Houthi forces disrupted over 100 vessels and forced major shipping reroutes around Africa.
The current pause reflects calculation.
By holding back, the Houthis preserve their most powerful leverage—the ability to disrupt one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors, responsible for roughly 10–12% of global trade.
Their strategy mirrors Tehran’s approach in the Strait of Hormuz.
Rather than continuous attacks, both actors are using chokepoints as economic pressure tools, raising risk levels just enough to influence global markets without triggering overwhelming retaliation. The Houthis have made clear that escalation remains conditional, tied to triggers such as Gulf state involvement in the war or expanded U.S. military operations.
The military toolkit is already in place.
The group maintains mobile missile launchers, low-cost attack drones, naval mines and explosive boats—an asymmetric arsenal designed to impose high costs on global shipping with relatively limited resources. The narrow geography of the Bab el-Mandeb amplifies this threat, making even sporadic attacks disproportionately disruptive.
The Houthis are among the least resource-rich actors in the conflict, yet they hold the potential to inflict outsized economic damage. A single successful strike on a tanker or container ship could trigger a cascade—insurance spikes, route closures and further strain on already disrupted supply chains.
For now, restraint serves multiple purposes.
It avoids direct confrontation with U.S. and allied naval forces, preserves the group’s domestic position inside Yemen, and keeps Saudi Arabia from re-entering a full-scale confrontation. At the same time, it maintains pressure by signaling that escalation can come at a moment of their choosing.
The global risk lies in convergence.
If Red Sea disruption were to coincide with continued instability in Hormuz, the result would be a dual chokepoint crisis—forcing global trade to reroute around Africa, increasing transit times and pushing energy prices sharply higher.
That scenario remains hypothetical—but increasingly plausible.
The Houthis are not stepping back from the war. They are positioning themselves within it, holding a decisive card that has yet to be played.
In a conflict defined by leverage, their restraint may be the most dangerous signal of all.
