Iran’s message to the Houthis changes the crisis. If Hormuz is blocked and Bab el-Mandeb is threatened, the Middle East’s two main energy routes could be disrupted at the same time — with the Horn of Africa pulled into the center of global strategy.
Why Tehran’s Houthi Signal Could Turn the Red Sea Into the Next Front of the Energy War
Iran is no longer threatening only the Strait of Hormuz. It is now signaling that the Red Sea could become the second front of the energy war.
Reuters reported that Iran has asked Yemen’s Houthi movement to prepare to close the Bab el-Mandeb gateway to the Red Sea if the United States strikes Iranian power infrastructure.
The report, based on three sources, said the idea has been discussed inside Iran’s leadership and conveyed to the Houthis, though Iran’s foreign ministry and the Houthis did not immediately respond to Reuters’ request for comment.
This is a major escalation because Bab el-Mandeb is not just another maritime passage. It is the southern entrance to the Red Sea, linking the Gulf of Aden, the Suez Canal route, East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and Europe-Asia trade. If Hormuz is the Gulf’s energy artery, Bab el-Mandeb is the Red Sea’s strategic valve.
The reported Iranian message shows a clear strategy: if Washington expands the war from military targets to Iran’s power network, Tehran could answer by raising the cost to the global economy.
That does not require Iran to defeat the U.S. Navy. It only requires enough uncertainty to make shipowners, insurers, energy traders and governments fear that two major export routes are unsafe at the same time.
The operational warning is serious. Reuters cited a source close to the Houthis saying the group had deployed missiles and drones near Bab el-Mandeb, including positions overlooking Hodeidah and the Gulf of Aden, and was waiting for an order. The same report said IRGC representatives already in Yemen would control the decision on when to close the strait.
That matters because the Houthis have already demonstrated their ability to disrupt Red Sea traffic. During earlier Red Sea attacks, major shipping companies diverted cargo around Africa, adding cost, time and insurance pressure.
Reuters reported last month that southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb traffic had still not returned to pre-October 2023 levels, with March 2026 crossings around half the September 2023 level.
The difference now is the wider context. Hormuz is already disrupted. Reuters reported that oil prices rose again as U.S.-Iran hostilities intensified, with Brent near $85.76 and WTI near $80.64, while both benchmarks had climbed nearly 13% in a week. The same report noted that Iran had pressed the Houthis to threaten the Red Sea route if the U.S. hit Iran’s power sites.
This creates the nightmare scenario for energy markets: a dual-chokepoint crisis.
Before the war, Hormuz carried around a fifth of global energy flows. After Iran’s closure of the strait, Saudi Arabia diverted significant energy exports westward through its pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. Reuters reported that the Red Sea now carries about 7% of global energy supplies and that Saudi Arabia has diverted roughly 70% of its energy exports through Yanbu.
That means the Red Sea is no longer just an alternative route. It has become the emergency route. If the Houthis strike shipping or Red Sea export infrastructure, Iran could pressure both the original artery and the bypass route.
This is Iran’s strategic logic. Tehran is trying to make escalation costly for everyone. If the United States attacks power infrastructure, Iran wants Washington, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Europe, Asia and energy markets to understand that the response may not come only inside Iran. It may come through Yemen, the Red Sea, Saudi export routes, tanker insurance and shipping delays.
That is why the Houthi factor is so dangerous. The Houthis do not need to occupy Bab el-Mandeb. They only need to make transit uncertain. A small number of drones, missiles, sea mines, armed boats or ambiguous attacks can change commercial behavior. As one regional source told Reuters, sophisticated missiles are not always necessary to interrupt shipping.
For Saudi Arabia, the threat is direct. Riyadh has already shifted major exports through Yanbu because Hormuz is unsafe. If the Houthis threaten Red Sea export infrastructure or shipping near Bab el-Mandeb, Saudi Arabia faces pressure on the route it needs most.
Reuters also reported that Saudi-linked regional sources say Riyadh is taking the Iranian-Houthi threat seriously and sees closer coordination between Tehran and the Houthis over the Red Sea.
For the United States, the strategic problem is widening. Washington began by trying to pressure Iran over nuclear, military and maritime issues. It is now facing a conflict that can spread across Gulf bases, Hormuz, Yemen, Saudi infrastructure, the Red Sea and the global oil market. Every strike intended to restore deterrence risks triggering another layer of escalation.
For Israel, the danger is also clear. Iran’s regional network is being activated not only against Israeli-linked vessels, but potentially against the wider maritime system that supports Israel’s allies and global trade.
The Houthis had already threatened Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, and shipping sources warned that Houthi target identification is unreliable enough to make many vessels avoid the route entirely.
For Somaliland and the Horn of Africa, this is not distant news. Bab el-Mandeb sits at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden. Any Red Sea crisis increases the strategic importance of Berbera, Djibouti, Aden, Assab, Port Sudan and other regional nodes.
Maritime surveillance, port security, logistics, naval access and airfield capacity will become more valuable if ships and militaries seek safer operating zones.
But opportunity comes with risk. A militarized Red Sea brings drones, intelligence operations, naval patrols, insurance shocks, proxy attacks, piracy fears and foreign competition closer to the Horn. Somaliland must understand this clearly: geography can become leverage, but it can also become exposure.
The central issue is that Iran is moving from direct retaliation to system pressure. Instead of matching the United States strike for strike, Tehran can stretch the battlefield through allied movements, chokepoints and economic arteries. That is classic asymmetric warfare: avoid America’s strength, attack its dependencies.
The Red Sea threat also shows why the war can no longer be analyzed as a narrow U.S.-Iran confrontation. It is becoming a corridor war. Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, Suez, Yanbu, Fujairah, Gulf bases and Red Sea ports are now part of one strategic map.
If the Houthis enter fully, the conflict changes character. It becomes harder to control, harder to insure, harder to negotiate and harder to end.
Iran’s reported request for the Houthis to prepare a Bab el-Mandeb closure is a major escalation signal. Tehran is warning that attacks on its power infrastructure could be answered through the Red Sea, not only through Iranian territory.
With Hormuz already disrupted and Saudi exports diverted toward Yanbu, Bab el-Mandeb has become the emergency valve of Middle Eastern energy.
A Houthi campaign there would threaten the only major alternative route, raise oil prices, pressure Saudi Arabia, expose global shipping and pull the Horn of Africa deeper into the crisis. The war is no longer about one strait. It is becoming a two-chokepoint confrontation.
By WARYATV Intelligence Desk | waryatv@waryatv.com
Strategic Assessments examine major geopolitical developments, separating events from implications and identifying the forces shaping what comes next.
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