EDITORIAL
How President Hassan’s Corruption Crushing Somalia’s Federal States
With allegations of blackmail and misuse of international funds, Somalia’s leader is accused of sacrificing national stability and democracy for personal political gain.
Imagine a country already grappling with poverty, instability, and conflict. Now, add to that a leader accused of playing political games that further entrench divisions and deprive citizens of desperately needed development resources. This is the reality facing Somalia, where President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud is facing mounting accusations of using international development funds as leverage to blackmail federal states into supporting his political agenda.
In a country where survival often depends on international aid, these allegations feel like a betrayal on the grandest scale—one that jeopardizes not only Somalia’s fragile democracy but also the well-being of millions.
Blackmail and Political Machinations
President Mohamoud’s alleged strategy is both simple and insidious: withhold international development funds from regional member states that refuse to back his election plans. This tactic is not just about political survival—it’s about consolidating power by crushing dissent. But the real cost of this power play is borne by ordinary Somali citizens in regions where these funds are crucial for education, healthcare, infrastructure, and even basic survival.
The president’s move has drawn the ire of local leaders, who say that Mohamoud is deliberately stoking divisions, transforming what should be collaborative governance into a high-stakes chess game. The message from the presidency is clear: get in line or get cut off.
One regional leader, who requested anonymity for fear of retribution, described the situation in stark terms: “It’s not about governance anymore—it’s about obedience. If you don’t bow down to Mogadishu, you’re out.”
The idea that a nation’s leader would gamble with development aid—funds that are meant to lift Somalia out of its cycle of poverty and instability—is not only shocking, it is infuriating. While the federal government continues to point to security and governance improvements in the capital, Mogadishu, the rest of the country is left to fight over scraps.
Regional States Held Hostage
Somalia’s federal states, each with their own pressing needs, rely heavily on international development assistance to address basic public services—everything from road construction to healthcare programs. Yet, under Mohamoud’s leadership, these funds have reportedly become a tool for blackmail. Any regional government that dares to question his policies or refuses to fall in line with his reelection strategy risks losing critical funding.
And it’s not just a matter of political preference. Withholding these funds exacerbates the already entrenched inequalities between Mogadishu and the regions, fanning the flames of resentment and further destabilizing the country’s fragile political landscape.
Consider a region like Jubaland, which has long been at odds with Mogadishu over autonomy and governance. Under Mohamoud’s alleged strategy, withholding funds could cripple the local government’s ability to provide basic services, deepening the divide and pushing citizens further into poverty and instability. These power dynamics leave regional leaders with an impossible choice: betray their constituents or risk losing the resources they need to govern.
International Donors in the Crosshairs
International development aid is supposed to be a lifeline, especially in a nation like Somalia, where decades of civil war and extremism have devastated infrastructure and public services. But if the allegations against President Mohamoud are true, then that lifeline is being weaponized for political gain.
For international donors—who often operate under the assumption that their aid will be distributed equitably—the accusations against Mohamoud are deeply troubling. Aid agencies and governments have long preached the importance of transparency and good governance. If development funds are being manipulated for political leverage, it could prompt international donors to rethink their support for Somalia altogether.
This scenario is a nightmare not only for the federal states but for the entire country. Somalia’s economy is fragile, and its reliance on international assistance is well-documented. A collapse in donor trust could result in aid cuts, driving Somalia into deeper economic despair and possibly igniting new waves of conflict.
As one Western diplomat put it, “We need assurances that our funds are being used to help people, not to serve one man’s political ambitions.”
The Death of Democratic Process?
Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of these alleged actions is the erosion of Somalia’s fragile democratic system. By holding development funds hostage, Mohamoud is not just undermining the autonomy of regional governments—he’s undermining the democratic processes that are essential to Somalia’s future.
Elections in Somalia are already precarious affairs, often marred by violence, corruption, and accusations of fraud. If regional governments are forced to support Mohamoud out of fear of losing essential funding, then democracy in Somalia becomes nothing more than a puppet show, with the strings pulled by Mogadishu.
This tactic reeks of authoritarianism, and it raises the question: How long before Somalia’s federal states fight back?
The seeds of discontent are already growing. Regional leaders are increasingly vocal in their opposition to the president’s tactics, and some are even considering pushing back more aggressively against Mogadishu. This internal conflict risks tearing the country apart at a time when unity is desperately needed to combat both economic challenges and the persistent threat of extremist groups like al-Shabaab.
The Human Cost
Amid these political power plays, it is easy to forget the real victims: the people of Somalia. For many, international aid is the only lifeline in a country where poverty, conflict, and instability are daily realities. With regional governments stripped of funding, the services that citizens rely on—healthcare, education, clean water—are at risk of vanishing.
Imagine being a mother in Puntland, watching your children suffer from malnutrition because the local government can’t secure the funds needed for food programs. Or imagine being a father in Galmudug, unable to access basic medical care because your regional hospital is shut down due to lack of resources.
These are not abstract concepts. These are the real, tangible consequences of President Mohamoud’s alleged blackmail of federal states. And as long as this political game continues, it is the Somali people who will pay the price.
A Ticking Time Bomb
The situation in Somalia is a ticking time bomb. President Mohamoud’s alleged use of international funds to blackmail regional states is not just a breach of trust—it’s a dangerous move that risks unraveling the entire fabric of the country.
Somalia needs a leader who can unite its people, not divide them for personal gain. As long as Mohamoud continues to play this high-stakes political game, the future of Somalia remains uncertain, and its people continue to suffer the consequences.
International donors and regional leaders must come together to demand transparency, accountability, and fairness in the distribution of development funds. The alternative is too grim to consider—a Somalia where corruption reigns, democracy is a farce, and its people are left to fend for themselves.
Analysis
Somaliland’s President Irro Engulfed by Political Fragmentation
Clan Tensions and Cabinet Chaos: Inside President Irro’s Most Dangerous Political Test.
HARGEISA — Not even a year into his presidency, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro finds himself boxed in by a convergence of political crises that threaten to overwhelm his administration.
What was meant to be a period of consolidation after a peaceful transfer of power has instead devolved into a landscape marked by factionalism, clan pressures and mounting diplomatic vulnerabilities. The stability that Somaliland has long projected to the world is now showing visible cracks.
The confrontation involving former president Muse Bihi Abdi at Cigaal International Airport has become the catalyst for a broader political unraveling.
What began as a dispute over vehicle access quickly escalated into gunshots, public outrage and, most dangerously, the mobilization of armed groups aligned with Bihi’s political base.
Their demand for an official government apology—accompanied by threats of retaliation—amounts to political coercion rooted in clan-based muscle. For a state that defines itself by its break from the militia politics of early 1990s Somaliland, this moment is deeply destabilizing.
Instead of containing the fallout, the government’s response intensified it. A statement by Minister of the Presidency Khadar Hussein Abdi—offering an apology while asserting that “Muse Bihi was wrong”—landed with equal parts confusion and frustration.
It signaled not conciliation but disarray, feeding into a growing perception that the executive is reactive, divided and unable to project coherent authority. For an administration already struggling to demonstrate internal discipline, the episode has become a symbol of weakness.
The airport standoff is only the most visible manifestation of a larger internal drift. Within Irro’s cabinet, conflicting public messages have become common, reflecting either poor coordination or deep ideological fissures. Both interpretations point to a governing structure that lacks cohesion at a time when unity is essential.
More alarming is the resurgence of clan politics, an old fault line that Somaliland worked for decades to contain. The recent dispute over the publication of the “Xeer Iise” customary law book revealed the administration’s inability to manage competing clan pressures.
The government’s abrupt reversal—from accepting the book to banning it amid rising tensions—underscored an executive caught between asserting national authority and placating powerful local constituencies. Meanwhile, clan elders increasingly dominate media debates in place of elected officials, signaling a drift away from institutional governance toward tribal arbitration.
This internal fragmentation comes at the worst possible moment. President Irro campaigned on the promise of achieving international recognition by late 2025—a deadline that now appears politically and diplomatically unrealistic.
Recognition requires stability, unity, and a government capable of demonstrating institutional maturity. Instead, Somaliland today presents an image of fracturing political order just as Somalia is exploiting diplomatic tools—such as new e-visa restrictions—to reinforce its own sovereignty narrative.
The cumulative effect is stark: President Irro is not navigating a temporary turbulence but confronting a structural crisis that threatens the foundations of Somaliland’s political model.
If unchecked, these overlapping fractures risk eroding three decades of hard-won statehood and weakening the very case for recognition that once defined his presidency.
Analysis
Why Somaliland Is a Target of Global Disinformation Campaigns—and Who Is Behind Them
Somaliland Faces a Coordinated Misinformation Assault: Evidence of Foreign Influence Campaigns Emerges.
The daily churn of online debate in Somaliland has begun to reveal something far more consequential than the fleeting noise of social media.
What once looked like ordinary digital conversation has hardened into a battlefield where no armies appear and no shots are fired, yet the damage reaches deeper than any conventional conflict.
Somaliland, like many small and transitional democracies, now sits squarely in the sights of a relentless information war—one designed to fracture trust, poison public discourse, and destabilize political gains at a moment when the country is making unprecedented diplomatic strides.
Under President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro, Somaliland has entered a rare period of international visibility, engaging with Djibouti, Kenya, the UAE, Qatar, and other regional partners in ways that strengthen its claim to recognition.
But progress has also made Somaliland a target. External actors—state-aligned, interest-driven, or opportunistic—have exploited digital platforms to push misinformation, inflame internal tensions, and project the illusion of widespread dissent.
The aim is to create psychological disruption before political disruption: to weaken a rising state by attacking its confidence from within.
A central element of this campaign is the weaponization of diaspora voices. A segment of Somalilanders living in Europe and North America have used geographic distance as a shield, spreading radical rhetoric, financing local unrest, and fueling clan-based hostility with an intensity rarely seen among those who actually live inside Somaliland.
Germany’s investigation into Somali influencers active during the Las Anod conflict—involving individuals who openly boasted about militia activity despite holding no valid asylum status—revealed a deeper security gap.
These actors not only import their conflicts into host countries, but they export new waves of grievance back home, often with devastating effect.
Such influence operations are neither spontaneous nor unique to Somaliland. A 2018 RAND Corporation study analyzing more than 22 million tweets exposed how foreign propaganda networks impersonate local identities to manipulate national conversations.
These networks mimic dialects, humor, and social norms to project manufactured sentiments as if they were authentic public opinion.
For years, versions of this tactic circulated widely in Somaliland’s digital sphere. Accounts posing as locals—writing in colloquial Somali, referencing local grievances—were later revealed through platform geolocation tools to be operating thousands of miles away.
The revelation was less a surprise than a confirmation of what many suspected: a coordinated effort to simulate internal division where none existed.
The objective of such campaigns is rarely to persuade people of a specific lie. It is to erode the very idea of truth. Once the public distrusts all narratives—official, journalistic, or grassroots—the battlefield is won. And in a region shaped by fragile institutions and clan-based political dynamics, the consequences of that fog are immediate and dangerous.
Somaliland’s adversaries have adapted their operations to the country’s changing geopolitical environment. As President Irro accelerates diplomatic outreach, the disinformation directed at him has intensified.
stories, manipulated videos, and coordinated misinformation echo across social platforms moments after major foreign policy announcements. Reliable sources indicate these attacks are not isolated but synchronized by anti-Somaliland factions seeking to undercut the country’s growing legitimacy.
Countering this offensive requires a strategy that extends beyond policing rumors. The government must formally alert host nations to the activities of diaspora actors who use Western legal protections to direct instability back home.
There is precedent: European states—Germany in particular—have begun scrutinizing communities whose online incitement has real-world consequences. Somaliland’s diplomatic corps can and should press for accountability.
At home, the Ministry of Information must confront the foundational weakness that makes these campaigns effective: a population that has never been structurally trained to interrogate what it sees online.
Media literacy is no longer an optional reform; it is a national security imperative. A core curriculum that teaches young people how to assess sources, identify manipulation, and understand algorithmic amplification would do more to defend the country than any reactive press conference.
Public institutions must also communicate faster and more transparently, giving citizens timely, factual information before manufactured narratives fill the void.
Somaliland has not been alone in confronting this landscape. Saudi Arabia, among others, has shown how sustained awareness campaigns and improved verification tools can help societies differentiate real sentiment from engineered outrage.
But Somaliland’s resilience will ultimately depend on individual vigilance—the ability of citizens to pause, question, and examine before sharing the content that adversaries rely on to inflame division.
The digital conflict facing Somaliland is a psychological one: a war against trust, identity, and the fragile sense of shared belonging that sustains any nation.
Its weapons are cheap, its operatives invisible, and its impact profound. Yet its greatest vulnerability remains the informed citizen. No technology—no matter how sophisticated—can substitute for a society that refuses to be manipulated.
Countering the Threat: Hostile Information Campaigns Against Somaliland
Somaliland’s Information War Is a Threat to National Security
EDITORIAL
Irro’s Leadership Tested as Opposition Pushes $15 Million Election Sabotage
DELAY = DISASTER: How Postponing 2026 Elections Could Destroy Somaliland’s Recognition Dream.
Somaliland’s political institutions face a pivotal test as disputes over voter registration and election timetables threaten to derail the country’s May 2026 presidential elections — a development that could significantly weaken Somaliland’s international credibility and complicate its long-standing bid for recognition.
The current standoff centers on opposition demands for a full voter re-registration process, a costly undertaking estimated at roughly $15 million. The National Electoral Commission (NEC), however, has proposed a $7 million update of the existing voter roll, arguing that a complete overhaul is unnecessary and would almost certainly force a delay of the 2026 vote.
At stake is far more than administrative procedure. Somaliland’s reputation as a stable, democratic outlier in the Horn of Africa has long been the backbone of its diplomatic outreach. Western partners often cite the country’s commitment to regular elections and institutional resilience as core components of its case for statehood.
A timely election would reinforce that narrative, demonstrating that political institutions — particularly the NEC — are capable of resisting partisan pressure and managing electoral disputes without external intervention.
A delay, however, would carry significant political and diplomatic costs, raising questions about institutional independence and reviving concerns about constitutional uncertainty that have shadowed previous election cycles.
President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro has made an on-time election a pillar of his administration, publicly pledging to support the NEC’s preparations. A successful May 2026 vote, would mark an early constitutional victory for the new president, bolstering both his political mandate and Somaliland’s international positioning.
But if the government is compelled to accept a full re-registration — a process that requires major financial resources and extended timelines — the setback would be significant.
It would not only undercut the president’s central promise but also strain public finances already committed to drought response, security operations, and other urgent national priorities.
The dispute also carries internal political implications. A prolonged delay could benefit opposition parties by offering more time for internal restructuring, realignment of factions, and consolidation of leadership positions.
At the same time, it risks undermining the aspirations of parliamentary and local candidates who depend on electoral certainty — turning what is envisioned as a national democratic process into a partisan contest over timing.
Beyond politics, the financial cost of a full re-registration poses its own challenge. The NEC’s streamlined update process is significantly cheaper, while the more expansive option sought by the opposition represents an additional $8 million in expenditure at a time when government revenues remain constrained.
Critics say the insistence on the higher-cost option appears designed to exert pressure on the administration rather than to address genuine electoral concerns.
Ultimately, the credibility of the 2026 elections — and the degree to which Somaliland’s institutions are perceived as resilient — will shape international engagement long after the vote.
Diplomatic partners have routinely emphasized that Somaliland’s democratic track record remains central to their willingness to deepen cooperation.
If elections proceed on time, Somaliland stands to strengthen its claim to recognition and reinforce its image as a stable and self-governing democracy. If they do not, analysts warn that the delay may erode hard-earned diplomatic capital and slow the momentum that Somaliland has built in recent years.
Somaliland President Irro Pledges On-Time Elections, Ensures NEC Support
Election Delay Plot Exposed: Opposition Exploits Voter Registration to Mask Internal Weakness
Western Diplomats Applaud Somaliland’s Elections, Urge Candidates to Respect Results
Brenthurst Foundation Observes “Free, Fair, and Credible” Somaliland Elections Amidst Challenges
EDITORIAL
The Man in White: Irro’s Peace Could Redefine Africa’s Blueprint for Stability
President Irro’s journey to Erigavo marks a turning point for Somaliland—and a potential model for a continent desperate for peace.
In Somaliland, President Abdirahman Irro’s daring peace mission to Erigavo blends diplomacy, tradition, and moral authority. His “Irro Doctrine” could redefine how Africa resolves its own conflicts.
HARGEISA, SOMALILAND — When President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi (Irro) stepped onto the tarmac in Erigavo draped in a white peace sheet, it was more than symbolism—it was a declaration. Behind him stood Grand Sultans and Garads, robed in matching white.
Ahead lay Erigavo, a city scarred by clan clashes yet brimming with the possibility of reconciliation.
This was no ordinary political tour. It was a pilgrimage for peace—an audacious act by a leader betting his young presidency on the one currency Somaliland has long mastered: stability.
A Homegrown Model for Peace

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi (Irro)
Somaliland’s survival story is an anomaly in African politics. While much of Somalia splintered into factional chaos after 1991, this unrecognized republic built order from the ruins—anchored not in foreign aid or international mediation, but in Guurti-led reconciliation and the indigenous code of Xeer.
Irro’s Erigavo Peace Initiative revives that founding logic. It marries statecraft with cultural legitimacy—bringing together elders, sultans, and political leaders in a process no foreign envoy could replicate.
“Our President’s key policy is to bring all Somaliland citizens together—healing divisions and strengthening our nation,” said Minister Khadar Hussein Abdi. “The world has much to learn from Somaliland’s unique path to peace.”
Crisis into Mandate
The peace mission comes after months of violent flare-ups in Sanaag, where over 45,000 families fled their homes amid militia clashes. Rather than deploy overwhelming force, Irro has chosen to nationalize the militias through security integration while simultaneously launching a grassroots reconciliation campaign—a dual strategy blending authority and empathy.
A former diplomat and Somaliland’s longest-serving parliamentary speaker, Irro brings a distinct pedigree to the crisis: a Cold War-trained statesman who believes stability is built from within.
His diplomatic outreach—to Kenya, the UAE, and Ethiopia—underscores a vision of Somaliland not as an isolated enclave, but as a regional stabilizer in a volatile Horn of Africa.
The Irro Doctrine

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi (Irro)
What’s emerging in Somaliland is more than a peace process—it’s a political philosophy. The “Irro Doctrine” rests on three pillars:
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Local ownership over foreign mediation;
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Cultural integration of elders and customary law into modern governance;
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Sacrificial leadership, where a president walks among his people not as a ruler, but as a reconciler.
This approach contrasts sharply with the externalized peace models dominating African diplomacy—from Sudan’s fractured truces to Congo’s endless summits. The difference lies in legitimacy. Irro’s authority stems from tradition, not treaties.
A Lesson for Africa
If the Erigavo conference delivers what it promises—an end to displacement, disarmament of militias, and genuine local reconciliation—Somaliland will not just secure its internal peace.
It will offer Africa a rare template: an indigenous, non-militarized approach to post-conflict nation-building.
For a continent weary of imported solutions and failed transitions, Irro’s white robes may come to symbolize something larger—a return to moral leadership grounded in heritage and humility.
The man in white is not just seeking peace for Sanaag. He is quietly reminding Africa that its salvation may lie not in the corridors of international diplomacy, but in the ancestral courtyards where its people first learned to make peace.
Warsangeli Clan Declares Unity Amid Escalating Violence in Erigavo
Somaliland Moves to End Conflict in Erigavo: Peace, Nationalization, and Unity for a Stable Future
SSC-Khatumo Declares War for Erigavo Amid Geopolitical Shifts Undermining Somaliland
Tensions Boil Over in Somaliland’s Sanag Region: Erigavo at the Brink of Full-Scale Conflict
Somalia’s Shadow War in Erigavo: Is Hassan Sheikh Mohamud Fueling Conflict?
From Conflict to Control: Civilian Disarmament Completed in the East
Heroes of the Nation: VP + General: One Nation, One Army — Somaliland Stands United
Somaliland’s Council of Ministers Convenes to Fortify National Development and Security
Somaliland Advances Nationalization of Civilian Army Amid Internal Challenges
SSC Khatumo Calls for Offensive, Somaliland Faces Backlash Over Militia Nationalization
EDITORIAL
Somaliland’s President Irro Turns Vision Into Action
Lower electricity bills, new schools, modern hospitals—inside the president’s drive to build a stronger, fairer republic.
It is a rare thing in politics to watch campaign promises so swiftly transformed into tangible projects. In Somaliland, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro) has, in less than a month, shown that leadership can mean more than speeches and symbolism. It can mean water running in new pipes, oxygen flowing into hospital wards, and classrooms filled with the next generation of Somaliland’s thinkers and leaders.
In Boorama, Gabiley, Hargeisa, Berbera, Oodweyne, and Burco, the past three weeks have felt like a cascade of change. Where citizens once carried water in jerrycans for miles, new wells and dams promise relief. Where hospitals once rationed critical supplies, modern oxygen generators now stand ready. And where students once dreamed of opportunity, graduation ceremonies at Amoud and Tima’ade universities have become celebrations of both personal and national progress.
Irro calls this governing philosophy Wadajir iyo Waxqabad—Unity and Action. The phrase is more than a political slogan; it is a strategic blueprint. Unity, in this context, means ensuring development is not hoarded by the capital but shared by every region. Action means delivering services not on paper but in bricks, pipes, wires, and working machinery.
The approach is deliberately decentralizing. By investing directly in local infrastructure—water plants in Gabiley, stadiums in Oodweyne, research centers in Daad-Madheedh—the administration is weaving together Somaliland’s diverse regions into a stronger, more cohesive whole. The signal is unmistakable: prosperity must be national, not regional; development must be felt by farmers in Wajaale as much as by traders in Berbera.
Nowhere is the ambition clearer than in water. From the Kalqoray Dam in Hargeisa to the Berbera Water Expansion Project and the desalination initiative in Gabiley, the government is attacking the scarcity problem at its root. Clean, reliable water is not just a social good; it is a foundation for health, agriculture, and economic growth. In a region where climate change has turned scarcity into crisis, Somaliland is quietly rewriting the narrative.
The same is true in healthcare. With new oxygen facilities in Gabiley and Boorama, and a specialty hospital under construction in Burco, Irro’s government is not simply patching holes—it is modernizing an entire system. Education, too, is receiving structural investment: land for Amoud University in Hargeisa, an Agricultural Research Center at Tima’ade, and seven new schools laid down in Daad-Madheedh. These are not the gestures of an administration content with managing decline. They are the scaffolding of a state preparing to endure.
Infrastructure and economics remain the other half of the equation. Roads and ports—Lughaya, Boorama Airport, the Boorama-Lawyacaddo corridor—are the arteries of Somaliland’s economic future. Reducing electricity prices in Berbera, Boorama, Gabiley, and Burco signals a government willing to use policy levers to ease daily burdens and stimulate growth. Even sports, often dismissed as non-essential, are treated here as instruments of nation-building: stadiums that will give young people pride, structure, and a sense of belonging.
The cumulative effect is striking. In place of distant promises, Somalilandis are seeing progress in their neighborhoods, their schools, their hospitals. For a country whose democratic experiment has long drawn praise abroad but frustration at home, Irro’s early months suggest a recalibration: democracy that delivers.
It is still early days, of course. Challenges remain—finances are tight, regional pressures are constant, and global recognition remains elusive. But if the measure of a presidency lies in whether people’s lives are visibly improved, then Somaliland has, at last, a leader who seems determined to ensure the state serves its people in ways both practical and profound.
The historian’s test is always whether leaders leave behind symbols or systems. President Irro appears intent on building the latter. And that may be the legacy Somaliland needs most.
EDITORIAL
Somaliland’s President Nominates Trump for Nobel Peace Prize
Trump, Somaliland, and America’s Next Strategic Opportunity.
By nominating Donald J. Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro) did more than flatter a global figure. He put forward a challenge: will the United States finally recognize a democracy that has proven its stability in one of the world’s most fragile regions?
For more than three decades, Somaliland has charted its own course—building democratic institutions, holding regular elections, maintaining internal security, and fostering economic growth. It has done this without the benefit of international recognition, even as it has consistently demonstrated the very values that Washington claims to prize: democracy, rule of law, and counterterrorism partnership.
President Trump’s record suggests he could be the one to break this deadlock. His foreign policy has always been less about process and more about outcomes. In Asia, the Middle East, and beyond, he has shown a willingness to engage unconventionally where traditional diplomacy failed. Somaliland sees in this style not just boldness but an opportunity: the chance for their long quest for recognition to be met with decisive U.S. action.
For Washington, recognition of Somaliland is not an act of charity—it is a strategic investment. The Horn of Africa is increasingly a theater of great-power competition. China has entrenched itself in Djibouti with its only overseas military base. Russia has been probing for port access in the Red Sea. Instability in Somalia continues to provide oxygen to al-Shabaab, a terrorist network with transnational reach. In this volatile mix, Somaliland stands out as a natural U.S. partner: secure, democratic, and eager for closer ties with the West.
Recognition would give the United States a reliable foothold in a strategic corridor linking the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean. It would strengthen America’s hand in counterterrorism cooperation, maritime security, and regional diplomacy. And it would send a powerful message: that democracy and resilience will be rewarded, not ignored.
Critics will argue that recognition risks destabilizing Somalia. Yet Somalia has been destabilized not by Somaliland’s independence, but by its own governance failures: a cycle of clan-based politics, corruption, and insurgency that has consumed international aid for decades with little to show. Somaliland’s success is not the cause of Mogadishu’s weakness—it is the counterexample.
President Irro’s nomination of Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize is therefore more than symbolic. It is a signal of trust in a leader who has built his political brand on challenging orthodoxy.
Trump has already positioned himself as a “peacemaker president,” promising to end protracted conflicts abroad. Here is an opportunity to do just that: recognize a democracy that has delivered peace for its own people, and in doing so, advance America’s security and strategic interests.
Somalilanders have waited patiently for 33 years. They are not asking the United States to build their democracy—they already did that themselves. What they are asking is recognition of reality: a stable, democratic partner in a region where the U.S. needs reliable allies more than ever.
President Trump could be the one to deliver it. And if he does, it would not only justify Somaliland’s faith in him but also remind the world that American leadership, when bold, can still reshape the map in favor of freedom and stability.
EDITORIAL
Somaliland: How Fake and Expired Medicines Are Putting Lives at Risk
An Unseen Crisis: The Dangers of Fake Medicine in Somaliland.
A recent police bust in Hargeisa didn’t just uncover a racket—it exposed a system. When officers arrested four Yemeni nationals allegedly repackaging expired drugs and doctoring expiry dates, they seized about $9,000 worth of products and cartons imported from China designed to make old medicines look new. If that sounds small, it’s because it’s the tip of a much larger iceberg.
The February 18 operation showed how easy it is to recycle expired drugs back into the market. The method is simple and deadly: repackage, relabel, and resell. People buy what they believe are safe medicines; instead, they take products that may be ineffective at best and lethal at worst.
The gaps don’t end at one warehouse. Weak oversight has allowed unqualified operators to open “clinics,” sell drugs, and even obtain fake medical certificates in minutes. Diagnosis is often guesswork; prescriptions can be profit-driven. As one source put it, some centers behave “like drug dealers,” keeping customers dependent rather than getting them well. It’s no surprise many patients now travel to Ethiopia or India for care they trust.
Consider Sado Mohamud from northern Hargeisa. She’d managed high blood pressure for years. After a new prescription from an unqualified provider, she suffered a stroke the next day. Her family complained; the clinic said the staffer was fired. Dozens of women nearby have reported similar outcomes—illness, coma, even death—shortly after taking medicines from rogue clinics. Behind every “case” is a family absorbing the loss.
Somaliland relies almost entirely on imported drugs. Without a strong screening and quality-control system, counterfeit and substandard products slip through. The well-off can source trusted medicines from abroad; most people can’t. That leaves the majority exposed to a market where the incentives favor volume over safety.
The wider picture: counterfeits kill
This isn’t a niche problem. Globally, estimates suggest up to a quarter of all drugs sold are fake—and in parts of Africa and Asia the share can exceed 50%. Counterfeits range from pills with no active ingredient (which fail to treat illness and fuel antibiotic resistance) to products cut with toxic substances. Past scandals—like fake versions of the cancer drug bevacizumab containing starch and salt, or a heparin contamination linked to dozens of deaths—show how quickly bad medicine becomes a mass-casualty event. Uncertain dosage and tainted injectables add infection, organ damage, and paralysis to the list of risks. The through-line is simple: counterfeits can kill and they destroy trust in the health system.
What must happen now
Somaliland doesn’t need to reinvent the wheel; it needs to enforce it.
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Emergency market sweep: Conduct immediate inspections of pharmacies, depots, and clinics; seize and destroy suspect stock.
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Licensing and closure powers: Freeze new licenses, audit existing ones, and shutter noncompliant outlets. Tie dispensing rights to verified credentials.
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Border and import controls: Require batch-level documentation, random lab testing on arrival, and serialisation/barcoding to track products.
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Criminal accountability: Fast-track prosecutions for relabeling, repackaging, or selling expired and fake drugs. Publicly name offenders to deter copycats.
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Whistleblower protection and hotlines: Make it safe—and worthwhile—for insiders and patients to report bad actors.
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Clinical guidance and audits: Issue clear prescribing rules, audit high-risk prescribers, and retrain or remove unqualified staff.
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Public awareness: Run simple campaigns—how to check a package, verify an expiry date, and avoid red flags.
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Regional cooperation: Work with Ethiopia and other neighbors on shared watchlists and cross-border intel.
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Independent quality testing: Stand up (or partner for) a basic medicines quality lab and publish results.
Accountability matters
Since the Hargeisa arrests, authorities haven’t provided a public update on charges, convictions, or broader reforms. Silence breeds impunity. Regular briefings—what was seized, who was charged, what changed—are as important as raids. People need proof the system protects them, not the profiteers.
Somaliland has built a reputation for stability against the odds. That credibility is now on the line in pharmacies and clinic back rooms. Crack down hard, communicate clearly, and make safe medicine the rule—not the exception. Lives depend on it.
Somaliland’s Crackdown: Yemeni Nationals Arrested for Repackaging Expired Medicine
EDITORIAL
Irro Comes to Washington: The Small Bet With Outsized Payoff
If you squint at the map, Somaliland looks like a sliver on the Horn of Africa. Look closer and you see leverage: a deep-water port at Berbera staring straight at the Bab el-Mandeb, the choke point where the Red Sea narrows and global trade squeezes through. That’s why President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro’s trip to Washington in the coming weeks isn’t diplomatic small talk.
It’s a test of whether the United States can still make smart, targeted deals that pay off in both security and industry.
A modest American footprint in Somaliland—access, logistics, surveillance, the unglamorous basics—would steady the route to Suez and complicate Beijing’s operating picture. Deterrence, after all, isn’t a slogan; it’s geography plus persistence.
Skeptics will wave this away as “complicated.” Or doubling down on a “One Somalia” policy that has struggled to deliver stability? For three decades, Somaliland has been the Horn’s outlier: elections, a functioning bureaucracy, and security cooperation that doesn’t lurch with every foreign payday. You don’t need to romanticize it to recognize a partner that does the basics well.
Security is only half the story. The other half sits in our phones, our missiles and our submarines: rare earth elements and other strategic minerals. China doesn’t just mine a big share; it dominates the bottleneck step—refining—where raw material becomes essential parts like high-performance magnets. That’s more than market power. It’s leverage over U.S. defense production.
Yes, America should build domestic capacity. But those projects take years—often decades. A parallel track with reliable partners is the only way to stop living at the mercy of a rival’s supply chain.
Somaliland has promising deposits and, more important, a government that actually wants a transparent, rules-based investment model. Think of it as the first mile in a non-Chinese “mine-to-magnet” pipeline: responsibly extract in Somaliland; refine with allied capacity; manufacture where it’s secure. If that sounds wonky, here’s the plain-English version: you can’t build the next generation of jets or grid batteries if your adversary controls the parts bin.
Washington has spent years trying to stabilize Somalia from the top down. The results are mixed on a good day. Somaliland, by contrast, has done the quiet work of building institutions from the bottom up. Recognition has lagged reality. Does U.S. recognition come with risks? Always. But strategic drift carries its own.
The Red Sea is more volatile, shipping insurance bills keep rising, and China’s ability to squeeze industrial inputs isn’t hypothetical. If a small, durable partner offers both a foothold and a way to diversify critical materials, you at least take the meeting with an open mind—and a concrete plan.
The plan doesn’t need to be grandiose; it needs to be sequenced and measurable. Negotiate clear access and overflight terms, plus a status-of-forces framework that’s public, boring, and durable.
Tie any minerals concessions to audited reserves, anti-corruption guardrails, environmental standards and community benefits. Lock in downstream refining with allies so ore doesn’t boomerang back to China. Stand up a joint maritime domain cell in Berbera to fuse commercial and military data and keep the lanes honest. Deliver something early—port upgrades, a shared ISR node, a pilot shipment refined through allied plants—then scale.
The quickest way to lose support is to promise the moon and deliver a press release.
There’s a line you hear in town when a sensible idea crosses an unfamiliar border: “Not now.” Not now because the lawyers aren’t ready. Not now because the map is messy. Not now because we might upset someone who’s already upset with us. “Not now” is how you wake up a few years from today with the same fragile sea lanes, the same supply-chain choke points—and fewer options.
Irro’s Washington swing won’t solve the Red Sea or rare earths by itself. But it’s a rare thing in geopolitics: a small bet with asymmetric upside.
If American policy is serious about checking China’s reach and hardening our industrial base, this is what action looks like: recognize facts on the ground, secure access where it counts, and build a supply chain no rival can choke. It starts with Berbera—and with treating Somaliland like the partner it has already proved itself to be.
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