Mapping the Perpetual Threat: Foreign Intervention and the Siege of Somaliland’s Sovereignty.

By Mo Saeed

Introduction:

This report examines two distinct but thematically linked allegations concerning external military intervention in Somaliland. The first is a well-documented historical case: the hiring of foreign mercenary pilots by the Mohamed Siad Barre regime to conduct a brutal aerial campaign against Hargeisa and other northern cities in 1988–1989. The second is a contemporary genocide against Somaliland that the current Federal Government of Somalia is seeking military support from Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia for similar purposes. This analysis aims to present the available facts, highlight potential parallels, and assess the implications of such external involvements.

The Historical Case: 

Foreign Mercenaries in the 1988–1989 Bombing Campaign:

In May 1988, the Somali National Movement (SNM) launched a major offensive in northern Somalia (present-day Somaliland), capturing parts of Hargeisa as they could no longer watch Barre’s regime systematically wiping Isaq people out from the Horn of Africa . The Siad Barre regime responded with a massive and indiscriminate military campaign aimed at crushing the rebellion and terrorizing the civilian population, actions widely characterized as war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Isaaq genocide, also known as the Hargeisa Holocaust.

Recruitment and Origin of Pilots:

To supplement its air force, the Barre regime hired foreign mercenaries . These pilots were primarily recruited from South Africa and former Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

One specific account notes that “bombing raids on the towns for one month  were conducted mainly by mercenaries recruited in Zimbabwe.

These mercenaries operated during the peak of the conflict in 1988–1989. They flew missions from the Hargeisa airport, targeting not only SNM positions but also conducting widespread, indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas in Hargeisa and surrounding regions. Their role was to provide the regime with additional aerial strike capacity for a campaign of collective punishment.

The objective was to support the Somali army in suppressing the civilians uprising by terrorising the civilian population through sustained aerial bombardment. This campaign resulted in the destruction of a large part of Hargeisa, Burao and caused thousands of civilian casualties, and is a central element of the planned  and executed genocide against the Isaaq clan. The use of mercenaries allowed the regime to conduct this intense bombing campaign despite potential constraints within its own military.

Recent reports and statements indicate  that the current Federal Government of Somalia is seeking direct military assistance from foreign states specifically Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia for operations against Somaliland with the aim of committing genocide again past genocide survivors. A prominent fact is that Somalia’s Minister of Defence requested his Saudi counterpart to conduct airstrikes against Somaliland and to facilitate the capture of its president.

Turkey  already has a significant military training and infrastructure presence in Somalia. The current evidence suggests this partnership could be expanded to include direct combat support.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia are being asked by Somalia to provide aerial military capabilities, reminiscent of the mercenary model used in 1988, though ostensibly through state-to-state agreements rather than private contracts. 

Turkey has already deployed F-16 fighter jets to Somalia to be precisely part of this plan. 

As of February 2026, these specific evidence of requests for bombing and capture operations reflect heightened tensions between Mogadishu and Hargeisa and a genuine fear in Somaliland of a return to large-scale, externally supported violence.

Historical Parallels:

The current requests evoke a direct parallel to the 1988 strategy, the Somali government seeking external aerial firepower to resolve its 60 year occupation with Somaliland. The historical precedent shows that such outsourcing of violence can lead to disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, with lasting humanitarian and political consequences.

Key Differences:

The historical case involved private mercenaries, while current evidence point to formal state actors.

The 1988 campaign occurred during the Cold War with less international scrutiny. Today, any such overt foreign military action would face immediate global attention and potential legal ramifications under international law.

Potential Implications:

For Somaliland this reinforces its deep-seated security fears and unhealed genocide scars  and it could destabilize the relative peace maintained since the 1990s.

For Regional Stability, it could  draw neighboring states into a proxy conflict, escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa.

For International Law, it would  raise serious questions about the legality of cross-border military actions at the request of a government against a territory that has maintained de facto independence for decades and has legitimate  and legal state continuity.

Conclusion:

The use of South African and Rhodesian mercenary pilots by the Siad Barre regime in 1988–1999 is a documented historical fact that exemplifies how external military capabilities can be harnessed for internal repression, resulting in atrocities. If Israel would not recognise Somaliland , Somalia  was seeking  support from Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia for assisting with their planned genocide.

 The international community must remain vigilant to ensure that external military involvement, in any form, does not enable further human mainly by mercenaries recruited in Turkey, Egypt or Saudi Arabia.

This recurring threat of genocide from Somalia  to Somaliland which is a de jure state underscore the critical need for the failed state of somalia respecting for international  law and  living peacefully with its neighbours to prevent any recurrence of the devastating  genocide and violence witnessed by somaliland  in the past. 

Somaliland is not claiming a right to secede from a functioning state. it is reclaiming a pre-existing statehood after a failed merger. This makes its case sui generis. 

By Mo Saeed
Somaliland legal research (SLR)

By Saleban Dahir Abdillahi (Dogox)

As the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza continues to redefine the moral landscape of the 21st century, Turkey has positioned itself as the preeminent defender of Palestinian rights. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has skillfully utilized the global stage to denounce Israeli military actions, invoke the sanctity of international law, and challenge the “double standards” of the West. Yet, beneath this veneer of pan-Islamic solidarity lies a discordant pattern of selective morality, dictated not by justice, but by cold strategic self-interest.

This inconsistency was laid bare following the transformative events of December 26, 2025, when Israel became the first UN member state to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland. Ankara’s response—a swift condemnation labeling the move as “interference in Somalia’s internal affairs”—reveals a profound contradiction. While Turkey preserves its right to maintain a complex, multi-layered relationship with Tel Aviv, it simultaneously denies the same diplomatic agency to Somaliland, a nation that has maintained democratic stability for over three decades.

The Pragmatism of Trade vs. The Rhetoric of Resistance

Turkey’s rhetorical support for Gaza is unmatched in its theatrical intensity, yet the material reality suggests a “managed recalibration” rather than a clean moral break. Despite the official trade suspension announced in May 2024, data from 2025 indicates that Turkish exports to Israel persisted via third-party channels, reaching nearly $394 million in the first half of the year alone.

For observers in Hargeisa, the takeaway is clear: Ankara views its own relationship with Israel through the lens of “strategic necessity” while framing Somaliland’s diplomatic outreach as an ideological betrayal. This widening gap between Ankara’s populist anti-Israel posturing and its continued economic pragmatism suggests that Palestinian solidarity has become a tool for domestic signaling rather than a consistent foreign policy priority.

The Spaceport and the Patronage of Mogadishu

Turkey’s role in Somalia is often presented as a model of altruistic Muslim solidarity. In practice, however, the relationship increasingly resembles a traditional patronage system designed to project Turkish power into the Indian Ocean. In January 2026, Turkey officially broke ground on its Somali Spaceport—an equatorial launch facility in the Jamaame region designed to grant Ankara independent access to orbit.

This deepening military-industrial entanglement explains Ankara’s hostility toward Somaliland’s developmental gains. Turkey does not merely seek the “unity” of Somalia; it seeks a monopoly of influence over the western shores of the Red Sea. When Turkey condemns the “destabilizing” nature of Israeli recognition for Somaliland, it conveniently ignores that its own expansion—including the massive TURKSOM military base and now a strategic spaceport—is equally transformative for the regional security architecture.

The Kurdish Mirror and Moral Credibility

Turkey’s claim to moral leadership is further eroded by its domestic record. The systematic repression of Kurdish political movements and ongoing military operations in northern Syria and Iraq contrast sharply with Ankara’s defense of self-determination in Gaza. A government that denies fundamental rights to millions of its own citizens struggles to present itself as a global champion of justice. This “Kurdish mirror” suggests that Turkey supports statehood and human rights only when they serve its specific geopolitical ambitions.

Asserting Somaliland’s Sovereign Narrative

In the wake of the December 26 recognition and the subsequent January 6, 2026, visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to Hargeisa, Somaliland must shift its diplomatic posture from seeking “permission” to asserting its restorative sovereignty. To counter Ankara’s selective morality, Somaliland should adopt a three-pillar strategy:

The 1960 Successor State: Hargeisa must emphasize that its recognition is not a “secessionist” act, but the restoration of its 1960 status as a sovereign state. By anchoring legitimacy in its original colonial borders, Somaliland aligns with the African Union’s own Charter regarding the sanctity of borders inherited at independence.

Sovereign Reciprocity: Somaliland should formally review the operations of Turkish-affiliated offices and cultural councils, such as the Maarif Foundation. If Ankara continues to leverage its Mogadishu-based projects to undermine Somaliland’s interests, Hargeisa is justified in re-evaluating the presence of Turkish entities within its borders.

Diplomatic Equality: Somaliland must demand that all international actors—including Turkey—interact through formal sovereign protocols. The era of “shadow diplomacy” is over; Hargeisa has demonstrated it is the only reliable, democratic partner in a volatile region.

Conclusion

Turkey’s reaction to Somaliland’s recognition reveals a broader pattern of control and contradiction. While Ankara speaks the language of justice, its actions—from its indirect trade with Israel to its spaceport in Jamaame—tell a story of calculated strategic gain. For Somaliland, the challenge is to assert its agency with the confidence of a state that has earned its place in the world. For Turkey, the question is more fundamental: can moral leadership truly be claimed when it is applied so selectively?

By Saleban Dahir Abdillahi (Dogox)

If you ever wondered why Somalia remains arguably the worst-governed country on Earth after 30 years of turmoil, look no further than the leaders who have run the show for the past two decades. It’s no secret—Somalia’s political class is suffering from a mental disorder that might best be called the “Somaliland Syndrome.”

This affliction manifests as an obsessive, pathological envy of Somaliland’s success, coupled with an absolute inability to replicate any of it.

While Somaliland quietly builds peace, stable governance, and economic progress, Somalia’s leaders appear trapped in a delusional loop, fixated on erasing Somaliland rather than improving their own failed system. Their diagnosis? “Somaliland is the disease. If only we could destroy it, everything would be fine.” Reality? Somaliland’s stability is the cure Somalia desperately needs.

This sickness explains a lot: rampant corruption, terrorist infiltration, foreign puppeteering, and endless power struggles are just symptoms.

The Somali state’s leadership—most glaringly the Himilo Qaran political party led by former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed—is the textbook case.

Here you have a man once tied to the Islamic Courts Union and arguably the spiritual father of Al-Shabaab, now championing national unity and elections. The irony could not be thicker.

How can a leader with “Somaliland Syndrome”—who spends more time fixating on Somaliland republic that has nothing to do with him—preside over a system so thoroughly entwined with terrorist groups and corruption? It’s like a sick man lecturing the healthy on how to run a marathon.

The recent clashes in Gedo—where the federal government’s forces face off with Jubbaland militias—highlight this dysfunction.

Himilo Qaran shamelessly blames Mogadishu for “escalating” violence, yet fails to acknowledge that the very government it opposes is the only entity attempting to assert order over a fractured state. Instead, it warns of “enemies approaching Mogadishu,” as if Somalia’s greatest enemy isn’t internal chaos and kleptocracy.

And who is behind these “enemies”? The party’s leadership has long been entangled with forces that either flirt with or actively support militant Islamism. It’s no surprise they decry federal military deployments as “political,” while using rhetoric that fans division.

Somalia’s government, meanwhile, accuses Jubbaland leader Ahmed Madobe of launching “criminal attacks” to resist federal authority. This tit-for-tat violence reflects a failed system where regional warlords operate as de facto rulers, and central governance is a fragile illusion.

So while Somaliland invests in governance, infrastructure, and diplomacy, Somalia remains mired in “Somaliland Syndrome,” a deadly cocktail of denial, envy, and self-destruction. The rest of the world watches, bemused and horrified, as Somalia’s political class preaches about elections while their country falls apart.

The bitter truth is that Somalia’s political sickness will only be cured by acknowledging Somaliland’s success—not by vilifying it. Until then, expect more chaos, more terrorism, and more tragic irony from a leadership too sick to heal their own nation.